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Such welcome and unwelcome things at once 
‘Tis hard to reconcile.1 
 
To grant woman an equality with man in the affairs of life 
is contrary to every tradition, every precedent, every 
inheritance, every instinct, and every teaching.  The 
acceptance of this idea is possible only to those possessing 
an especially progressive tendency and a strong sense of 
justice, and it is yet too soon to expect these from the 
majority.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written about the history of progressivism,3 its 
varied and sometimes contradictory meanings,4 and the 
philosophical,5 political,6 and legal7 movements identified as being 
progressive.  Although the term is ubiquitous in certain circles of 
the American political left,8 it is not commonly used in the national 
 
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 4, sc. 3. 
 2. 4 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE xiii–xxxiii (Susan B. Anthony & Ida 
Husted Harper eds., 1902). 
 3. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992) (examining the rise of the 
progressive movement and its challenge to social and economic inequality); 
Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493 (1996) 
(reviewing NEIL DUXBRY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)). 
 4. See ALAN FREEMAN, Antidiscrimination Law from 1954 to 1989: Uncertainty, 
Contradiction, Rationalization, Denial, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE 
CRITIQUE 285 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). 
 5. See, e.g., J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and 
Constitutional Thought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499, 542–54 (2004). 
 6. See Editorial, On the Move, THE NATION, June 26, 2006, at 3. 
 7. Robin L. West has contributed an immense amount of scholarship in this 
area.  See, e.g., ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS 
OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003) [hereinafter WEST, RE-
IMAGINING JUSTICE]; Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 641, 678–79 (1990) [hereinafter West, Constitutionalism]. 
 8. In particular, the people and groups who seek policies more leftist than 
the current Democratic party is willing to prioritize often self-identify as 
progressives.  See, e.g., The American Prospect, History and Mission, http://www. 
prospect.org/web/page.ww?name=About+Us&section=root (last visited Nov. 1, 
2006) (“Our conservative counterparts have played a critical role in pulling the 
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public policy discourse or the mainstream media.9  Some 
commentators question whether American progressivism has 
ceased to exist in any significant way.10 
Without attempting to reconcile these rich areas of inquiry, 
this article explores whether continuing progressive vitality is 
revealed in the interpretation of one problematic aspect of sexual 
harassment law in Minnesota.  First, this article briefly identifies 
what are usually considered progressive ideals and how those goals 
have been translated into laws impacting sexuality, women’s rights, 
and sexual harassment.11  Next, it explores what progressive should 
mean in the context of a vital requirement in proving workplace 
sexual harassment—that the complained-of conduct was 
unwelcome.12  Then, it analyzes the extent to which, in its 
treatment of this area of the law, Minnesota fulfills its promise as a 
progressive state.13 
II. PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATION OF UNWELCOMENESS – WHAT 
WOULD IT LOOK LIKE? 
A. Defining “Progressive” Ideals, Goals, Laws 
In general, progressive ideas, policies, and movements are 
founded on the notion that society can be improved by moving 
beyond established tradition.  Progressive theories advocate trying 
new ways to counteract social and economic inequality.14  In 
 
entire national debate to the right.  We intend to take it back.”); Center for 
American Progress, The Progressive Priorities Series, http://www.american 
progress.org/projects/progressivepriorities/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) (series of 
papers promoting “progressive priorities” that include universal health insurance 
and reducing payroll taxes in favor of restructured income taxes). 
 9. Rather, discussions of politics in the mainstream American media are 
usually limited to the liberal-versus-conservative dichotomy. 
 10. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Is American Progressive Constitutionalism Dead?, 4 
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. i, i (1999) (“[N]either the United States Congress nor the 
Supreme Court has been decidedly progressive for at least twenty-five years, if ever 
at all. . . . [T]he future appears unlikely to contain a truly progressive judiciary. . . . 
Similarly, progressivism is no longer represented in the Congress, nor is it 
anything but a forgotten voice in American constitutional and political culture.”). 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See, e.g., James M. Caponi, Can’t We Get Along?: Progressive Constitutionalism 
and the Struggle for Existence and Understanding Within the New Federalism, 4 WIDENER 
L. SYMP. J. 429, 443 n.81 (1999) (citing West, Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 643 
(noting that progressives view the Constitution as a mechanism for challenging 
3
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response to the hierarchical effects of capitalism, progressives tend 
to seek governmental standards to ensure a level of fairness and 
equality that the unrestricted market cannot be relied upon to 
provide.15 
From the progressive point of view, government is an 
instrument of good.16  Modern progressives seek governmental 
action to construct social policies that provide power to the 
otherwise disenfranchised.17  The belief is that government 
intervention ensures fairness for ordinary people against the power 
of big business, entrenched interests, and the privileged classes.18  
As a result, economic policies considered progressive tend to favor 
lower-status and lower-income persons.19 
But society cannot achieve such fairness without fundamental, 
sometimes unsettling, change.  Because the traditional social 
structure is believed to preserve power in the established elite, 
progressives favor efforts to disrupt the existing social hierarchy 
and move toward the goal of social equality.20  Typically, these 
 
entrenched social and economic inequality)); Hill, supra note 5, at 547–48  
(“[P]rogressives argue that total social freedom can be expanded by adjusting (or 
equalizing) societal conditions to promote greater freedom of choice among 
individuals.”); Michelle McGovern, A Progressive Perspective on Pronography [sic]:  
American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 451, 470 (1999) 
(quoting Justice Brandeis as advocating progressive social and economic 
experimentation by state legislatures); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect 
and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1101 (2004) (arguing that progressive 
taxation justifiably redistributes wealth to reduce economic disparity). 
 15. Center for American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org/ 
aboutus (last visited Nov. 1, 2006) (statement of purpose from the Center for 
American Progress indicating, among other things, that making America a country 
of boundless opportunity “will only be achieved with an open and effective 
government that champions the common good over narrow self-interest, 
harnesses the strength of our diversity and secures the rights and safety of its 
people”) 
 16. J. LEONARD BATES, THE ORIGINS OF TEAPOT DOME:  PROGRESSIVES, PARTIES, 
AND PETROLEUM, 1909–1921 1 (1963). 
 17. See West, Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 678–79. 
 18. BATES, supra note 16, at 2. 
 19. For example, the IRS Glossary defines “progressive tax” as “[a] tax that 
takes a larger percentage of income from high-income groups than from low-
income groups.”  Internal Revenue Service, Glossary, http://www.irs.gov/app/ 
understandingTaxes/jsp/ tools_glossary.jsp (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).  “Regressive 
tax” is defined as “[a] tax that takes a larger percentage of income from low-
income groups than from high-income groups.”  Id.  For an in-depth discussion of 
progressive tax policy, see Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal 
State: Progressive-Era Economists and the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 1793 (2005). 
 20. West, Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 679. 
4
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efforts have been focused on economic empowerment, with the 
idea that those who perform the work of the society should be 
entitled to receive the benefits of the society.21 
Justification for government-mandated social change is 
grounded sometimes in the moral imperatives of justice and 
equality.22  Sociologist Fred Block cites the effort to inhibit the 
unrestrained power of big business as one of the great popular 
movements designed to connect economic and political institutions 
with “our deepest moral commitments.”23  Block argues that to gain 
support for their ideas in the current political climate, progressives 
must develop a narrative describing a “moral economy,” where the 
government moderates otherwise selfish individual goals to achieve 
the objective of a moral society.24 
A brief comparison to general notions of conservative ideology 
further clarifies our definition of progressive.  One criticism of the 
conservative political doctrine is that its adherence to tradition 
inhibits the potential for positive change.25  Conservatives trust 
 
 21. See William J. Maakestad & Charles Helm, Promoting Workplace Safety and 
Health in the Post-Regulatory Era: A Primer on Non-OSHA Legal Incentives That Influence 
Employer Decisions to Control Occupational Hazards, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 9, 17–18 (1989) 
(describing progressive advocacy for workers compensation programs in the U.S.); 
Molly S. Mcusic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the Workplace, 
82 IOWA L. REV. 1339, 1344–45 (1997) (listing progressive workplace reforms and 
critiquing the implicit model of the universal white male worker, whose wife was 
expected to work at home or serve as a second-class employee).  For an example of 
more recent progressive workplace reform efforts, see Scott L. Cummings, 
Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement 
for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 492–93 (2001) (advocating community 
economic development through legal advocacy for living wage ordinances and 
other policies that improve the economic conditions of low-income workers). 
 22. Some authors argue that a connection to religious-based moral 
imperatives is required for progressives to impact social and political discourse.  
Eric Alterman, With God on Our Side?, THE NATION, Mar. 20, 2006, at 10.  
“American progressive reform has never advanced without a moral awakening 
entangled with notions about what the Lord would have us do.”  Id.  A discussion 
of religious doctrine concerning the place of women in society and treatment of 
sexuality is, however, beyond the scope of this article. 
 23. Fred Block, A Moral Economy: To Seize the Political Moment, Democrats Need a 
Better Narrative, THE NATION, Mar. 20, 2006, at 19. 
 24. Id. at 18. 
 25. Kevin Drum, Political Animal, WASH. MONTHLY, http://www. 
washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2004_03/003574.php (Mar. 29, 
2004, 15:10 EST) (“Conservatives, almost by definition, are absorbed by the 
past.”).  Others argue that deference to tradition is good for democracy.  GILBERT 
K.  CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 85 (1908) (“Tradition means giving votes to the most 
obscure of all classes, our ancestors. It is the democracy of the dead. Tradition 
refuses to submit to the small and arrogant oligarchy of those who merely happen 
5
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neither current political actors nor social consensus, rather they 
advocate adherence to time-tested social and legal structures that 
are immune from the whims of the majority.26  For conservatives, 
the collective wisdom of generations is far more reliable and 
desirable than the conclusion of any one modern individual.27  As 
such, they seek to conserve the status quo in society and in the law 
(or at least how they perceive it).28  This means preserving the 
institutions and social structures that generated the entrenched 
principles they value.29 
From a conservative perspective, the value of law lies in its 
ability to preserve the established social structure by means of rules 
governing human behavior.30  Conservative goals promoted by 
regulating behavior might include promoting “public peace for the 
benefit of the entire community.”31  Social rules enforced by law 
support the institutions (fatherhood, maternity, inheritance) and 
identities (fathers, children) that promote stability and 
predictability of the past.32  By maintaining the social order through 
direct reference to the past, the likelihood of upheaval and conflict 
is seen as lessened.33 
Progressives, in contrast, seek laws that facilitate change from 
existing tradition.  They see conflict and upheaval as necessary risks 
warranted by the benefits of a more just society.  Law provides the 
power to enable a society to move beyond the inertia of tradition, 
moderating the selfish impulses of human behavior to improve the 
conditions of the society overall. 
Progressivism, however, shares some aspects of conservative 
ideology.  Both conservatives and progressives believe that 
government should create structures that promote (their view of) 
an ideal society.34  Both progressives and conservatives view the 
 
to be walking about.”). 
 26. West, Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 652–54. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 168 (describing the “moral 
point” of law according to conservative jurisprudence). 
 31. Dana Neacsu, Tempest in a Teacup or the Mystique of Sexual Legal Discourse, 38 
GONZ. L. REV. 601, 604 (2003). 
 32. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 167–68. 
 33. Neacsu, supra note 31, at 604 (identifying the promotion of “public peace 
for the benefit of the entire community” as a goal of conservatives). 
 34. Frank Michelman, What (If Anything) is Progressive – Liberal Democratic 
Constitutionalism?, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 181, 198–99 (1999). 
6
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judiciary as incapable of neutrality.35  As a result, they share the 
belief that judicial decisions based on the Constitution are 
necessarily affected by the political process.36  Where conservatives 
and progressives completely diverge is in their ultimate goals: 
progressives seek state actions that upset the structure of social 
hierarchy, while conservatives favor state actions that preserve 
patterns derived from the established social structure.37 
1. Sexuality 
Whereas progressive efforts once focused on promoting 
economic and social justice, the quest for this type of change has 
resonated little with the general public during recent decades.38  As 
a result, other goals have been moved to the progressive forefront.  
At least one author has opined that “in a society in which the quest 
for socio-economic equality has come to a halt, sexual equality 
seems to represent the most progressive goal that one can reach.”39 
Progressive treatment of sexual issues seeks legal protection 
for what many consider individual rights against government 
regulation.40  These relatively recent developments in the law limit 
government intrusion on personal choices regarding intercourse, 
contraceptives, masturbation, abortion, and familial living 
arrangements.41  It is argued that enlarging the areas in which the 
government cannot impede sexual decision making promotes 
 
 35. West, Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 644. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 679. 
 38. Neacsu, supra note 31, at 652–53. 
 39. Id. at 603.  The author categorizes the opposing movements favoring legal 
regulation of sexuality as “permissive individual rights” (progressive) and 
“repressive legislation” (conservative).  Id. at 613. 
 40. See id. at 603 (identifying the right to engage in contraceptively protected 
intercourse with one’s spouse as among the “new individual rights with a sexual 
content”). 
 41. See id., at 603 n.9 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 
(1977) (nonnuclear family living arrangements); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, (1972) (nonprocreative 
contraceptive nonmarital intercourse); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) 
(masturbation); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (nonprocreative 
marital intercourse); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreative 
marital intercourse); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (intercourse in 
a secluded automobile)).  See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and 
Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631, 640 (discussing the history and evolution of 
the jurisprudence of sodomy laws in the United States). 
7
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greater tolerance and a more democratic society.42  Conversely, 
efforts to restrict and regulate sexuality generally are considered 
“conservative.”43  Laws that impose sexual abstinence, criminalize 
obscenity, and restrain sexual expression fall on the anti-
progressive end of the scale.44 
2. The Rights of Women 
Legal developments that identified and protected individual 
rights in the area of sexual autonomy are especially significant to 
women, who have been subject to more cultural and governmental 
intrusion than men.  In the same progressive spirit, laws forbidding 
gender discrimination are intended to create social change by 
alleviating the unequal treatment of women in the workplace and 
in society as a whole.45  Because traditional power structures have 
marginalized and subordinated women,46 society identifies 
progressives as those who support policies and legislation that 
promote women’s rights.47  The underlying theory is that the law 
should play a role in reforming cultural biases that perpetuate 
inequality.48  By imposing rules that aim to dismantle the effects of 
social injustice and interpreting the law in a manner that refuses to 
countenance harmful biases of the past, the law promotes justice.49  
 
 42. Neacsu, supra note 31, at 603. 
 43. Id. at 604 (“Conservatives, on the other hand, have used sexually-oriented 
legislation to create a chimera of social order and predictability.”). 
 44. Id. (cataloging such legislation as conservative). 
 45. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (W.D. Wash. 
2001) (stating that the purpose of Title VII is to eliminate discrimination in 
employment and “to place all men and women, regardless of race, color, religion, 
or national origin, on equal footing in how they were treated in the workforce”). 
 46. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 116–18 
(2005) (“No woman had a voice in the design of the legal institutions that rule the 
social order under which women, as well as men, live.”). 
 47. See Rafael Chodos, Protecting the Righteous Employer Against Abusive Sexual 
Harassment Claims: Two Modest Proposals, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 565, 573–74 (1995) 
(describing Title VII as arising from progressive forces of the 1960s that sought to 
end discrimination against women in the workplace through legislation).  See also 
Katha Politt, Regressive Progressive, THE NATION, May 27, 2002, at 10 (excoriating 
then-Presidential candidate Dennis Kucinich for being a much-touted progressive 
candidate with an anti-progressive voting record on abortion rights). 
 48. See Jane H. Aiken, Protecting Plaintiffs’ Sexual Pasts: Coping With 
Preconceptions Through Discretion, 51 EMORY L.J. 559 (2002) (noting the enactment 
of rules of evidence meant to overcome disfavored preconceptions). 
 49. See West, Constitutionalism, supra note 7, at 693 (delineating progressive 
constitutional interpretation of the equal protection clause as aimed at “correcting 
maldistributions of social power, wealth, and prestige” and “a tool for dismantling 
8
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Actual changes in social views are hoped to follow.50 
There is not, however, always a clear consensus on which laws 
and underlying doctrine actually effect the desired social changes.  
Some criticize the development of a legal equality doctrine that 
begins with an assessment of whether or not the woman is “similarly 
situated” to the man as a standard that permits continued 
discrimination based upon socially perceived differences between 
men and women.51  While legal treatment of women has improved, 
many commentators argue that the law continues to validate 
women’s subordination.52 
Similarly, efforts of the early Progressive Movement to improve 
the status of women are viewed as causing contradictory effects.  
Leaders pushed for enhancements of women’s legal rights, 
including the right to vote and improvements in employment 
opportunities.53  While these advocates sought legislation 
protecting both male and female workers from employer abuses, 
they also tended to support special protections for female 
employees.54  Unfortunately, the creation of special laws that 
 
society’s racist, misogynist, homophobic, patriarchic, and economic hierarchies”). 
 50. See Chodos, supra note 47, at 573–74 (noting that 1960s 
antidiscrimination and affirmative action legislation were promoted by the notion 
that “the results of bad attitudes,” i.e., workplace discrimination, “had to be 
extirpated and that legislation was a good way to extirpate them”).  Chodos, who 
critiques sexual harassment law as unfair to employers, goes on to characterize the 
era as “when the law began to subscribe enthusiastically to the notion that we can 
raise the consciousness of offenders by lightening their pockets.”  Id. at 574. 
 51. See Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s Subordination and the 
Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151 (David Kairys ed., 
rev. ed. 1990) (conceding that Equal Protection doctrine has made some progress 
toward eliminating sex discrimination, but criticizing “the legal ideology of 
equality” for legitimizing differential treatment). 
 52. Diane Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF 
LAW:  A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 294, 297 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (“Over the past 
century, the legal system has rejected some of its most blatant sexist notions and 
expressions without ceasing to reinforce male power and female subordination.”). 
 53. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, LA FOLLETTE’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY; A 
PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCES 311–18 (1913).  La Follette gushed 
over the intelligence of women in his family in an apparent effort to establish why 
he believed women to be capable of providing wise counsel on political and legal 
matters.  Id. at 312–14.  La Follette promoted increased participation of women in 
public life by appointing them to state executive positions and supporting 
women’s sufferage.  Id. at 314–18. 
 54. Joan Hoff, Women and the Constitution, in THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION: 200 YEARS OF ANTI-FEDERALIST, ABOLITIONIST, FEMINIST, 
MUCKRAKING, PROGRESSIVE, AND ESPECIALLY SOCIALIST CRITICISM 239–40 (Bertell 
Ollman & Jonathan Birnbaum eds., 1990) (“Progressive women’s ideology and 
goals are also difficult to appreciate today because they seem contradictory and 
9
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applied only to women reinforced stereotypes that justified 
discriminatory treatment of women, particularly in the workplace.  
Another criticism of the movement for special protections is that it 
disempowered women by reinforcing their traditional roles.  
Implementation of such special protections connoted that women 
were fragile, submissive, and in need of safeguarding.55  The 
justification for these protections placed an inordinate emphasis on 
women’s capacities to reproduce, focusing on this essential aspect 
of womanhood over any differences that individual women might 
have.56  This rationale articulated motherhood as the primary role 
of all women.57 
As a result, laws that effectively restricted women to lower-
paying, lower-prestige jobs were justified because of the 
childbearing function that society assumed all women had.  
Moreover, lawmakers used the physical demands of childbearing 
and the relative frailty of women as a further basis for restricting 
women in the workplace.  They relied upon the demands of 
motherhood without regard for whether individual women in fact 
were or intended to become mothers.58  Lawmakers also assumed 
 
ambiguous.  On the one hand, Progressive women explicitly committed 
themselves to women’s rights – the right to equal political participation and to the 
opportunity for meaningful, productive, and well-paid work.  On the other hand, 
the very same women successfully established legal constraints on women’s rights 
in the work place.”). 
 55. Id. at 239 (stating that both the idea and the actuality of special legislation 
for women workers “strengthened sexual segregation and stratification patterns in 
the labor market . . . were based on the assumption that women would always be 
cheap, temporary, unskilled labor . . . [and] helped define patterns of 
discrimination against female wage-earners, limited women’s economic 
opportunities, and reinforced stereotypic notions of women as frail, passive, and 
dependent.”). 
 56. Id.  See also, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 
1989), cert. granted, 494 U.S. 1055 (1990) (upholding employer policy that all 
women of childbearing age, regardless of whether they intended to have children, 
were prohibited from employment in a battery manufacturing plant to protect 
their potential fetuses from lead poisoning). 
 57. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 51, at 164–65 (describing the Supreme 
Court’s upholding a statute that forbade employment of women for more than ten 
hours per day in a laundry in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)). 
 58. The perception that all women are by default potential mothers has never 
been eliminated.  A recent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report has 
been characterized as urging today’s women to act like they are always pregnant, 
regardless of whether they intend to become pregnant.  January W. Payne, Forever 
Pregnant Guideline: Treat Nearly All Women as Pre-Pregnant, WASH. POST, May 16, 
2006, at F1.  The report itself focused, among other things, on the need for health 
insurance and health care to be made available to the lower-income and minority 
10
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that women were weaker, without considering that some women 
might be physically vigorous or that some men were less physically 
capable than some women, thus “bolster[ing] a highly traditional 
and restrictive definition of woman’s role in society generally as 
well as in the workplace.”59 
Tensions between the goals, means, and effects of the laws 
intended to alleviate gender inequity continue to be noted 
throughout the legal terrain.  Developments that some herald as 
advancing women’s status in society are savaged by others.  For 
example, commentators disagree on the progressive nature or 
social benefits of laws designed to facilitate equality by forbidding 
discrimination,60 regulating pornography,61 or criminalizing 
prostitution62 and statutory rape.63 
3. Sexual Harassment Law 
The relatively recent addition of sexual harassment law to the 
 
women who are most in need of pre-pregnancy assistance and contraceptive 
planning.  Recommendations to Improve Preconception Health and Health Care – United 
States, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention), Apr. 21, 2006 at 11, 13–14.  These guidelines are troublesome in their 
potential to be used to justify prosecution of women for engaging in conduct that 
harms their fetuses.  Moreover, the guidelines ignore the fact that not all women 
are potential (biological) mothers, including those without fully functioning 
reproductive systems and those who do not have sex with men. 
 59. Hoff, supra note 54, at 239. 
 60. For a summary of the feminist debate concerning formal equality versus 
substantive equality, see Note, Feminist Legal Analysis and Sexual Autonomy: Using 
Statutory Rape Laws as an Illustration, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1068–71 (1999). 
 61. See Dana A. Fraytak, The Influence of Pornography on Rape And Violence 
Against Women: A Social Science Approach, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 274–75 (2001) 
(outlining debate as to whether anti-pornography laws advance or undermine 
women's rights and progressive causes); Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's 
Liberation: Against Porn Suppression, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1994) (arguing that 
efforts to suppress pornography enable censorship of progressive ideas and legal 
restrictions on women's sexuality).  See also NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING 
PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS (1st ed. 
Scribner, 1995).  [Editor’s Note:  See Strossen’s article in this issue: Nadine 
Strossen, “Is Minnesota Progressive?” A Focus on Sexually Oriented Expression, 33 
WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 51 (2006).] 
 62. See Gregg Aronson, Note, Seeking a Consolidated Feminist Voice for Prostitution 
in the US, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 357 (2006) (discussing three competing 
schools of feminist thought concerning prostitution). 
 63. See Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master’s House: Of Protection, Patriarchy 
and the Potential for Using the Master’s Tools to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50 
DEPAUL L. REV. 799, 803–07 (2001) (describing feminist advocacy for, and critique 
against, statutory rape laws). 
11
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gender equality arsenal has provoked similar debate.  Sexual 
harassment law was constructed using the anti-discrimination 
framework to curb behaviors once seen as normal, natural, and 
innocuous.64  These laws broke from traditional acceptance of this 
type of discrimination by identifying new rights.65  The intent was 
not so much to facilitate litigation or provide a remedy, as to 
modify the ways in which people interacted in the workplace.66  The 
creation of a government-sponsored ban on sexual harassment at 
work provides an example of progressive regulation of selfish 
impulses in order to improve conditions for society as a whole.67 
The laws protecting employees from having to endure sexual 
harassment in the workplace represent a progressive effort to 
empower two traditionally marginalized groups—employees, and, 
in particular, women employees.  In keeping with progressive 
ideals, these laws impose the burden of taking steps to eliminate 
such conduct upon employers.68 
Many commentators believe that, despite the failure to achieve 
sexual equality in the workplace and in society, sexual harassment 
law serves as an example of successful progressive advocacy.69  
Others argue, however, that conservatives co-opted sexual 
harassment law to serve their goals of reinforcing women’s 
subordination.70 
 
 64. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII 
Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 110–11 (1995) 
(describing cases in the early 1970s where federal courts rejected efforts to 
articulate sexual harassment claims as outside the scope of Title VII). 
 65. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (stating that Title 
VII provides employees the “right to work in an environment free from 
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult”). 
 66. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that 
Congress intended to remove “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of 
racial or other impermissible classification”). 
 67. See Block, supra note 23, at 19. 
 68. See L. Robert Guenthner, III, Who is the Victim Here?: Vicarious Sexual 
Harassment After Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Authority, 55 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 299, 302 n.12 (“The notion that employers are the ones best suited to 
bear the costs of sexual harassment in the workplace, rather than the victim, is a 
progressive social statement that tells employers they must do the right thing and 
take proactive steps to limit and remove this problem from the workplace.”). 
 69. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 46, at 162–79. 
 70. Some commentators argue that sexual harassment law has gone too far in 
seeking to eliminate harassment.  Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a 
Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 782 (2006) (citing Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized 
Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003)).  See also Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong 
with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997) (arguing that Title VII 
12
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B. Exemplifying “Regressive” – The Requirement of Unwelcome Conduct 
The framework of sexual harassment law’s prima facie case 
incorporates among its criteria that a complaining employee must 
establish that the offending conduct was unwelcome.71  This 
element, when contested by defendants, shifts the focus of the 
inquiry from the wrongful conduct engaged in by the defendant to 
the allegedly inviting behavior of the plaintiff.  The case then 
centers on whether she72 welcomed the harassment by behaviors 
such as failing to complain after it occurred, maintaining some type 
of relationship with the harasser, or engaging in any sexually 
related talk or behavior, whether at work or on her own time.73 
This element of a prima facie case is widely seen as detrimental 
to the progressive cause of changing society to improve the 
perception, status, and actual lives of women.74  Requiring women 
who complain of workplace harassment to prove the conduct was 
demonstrably75 unwelcome harkens back to traditional, 
disempowering assumptions about women’s roles, including the 
assumption that women who work outside the home may be 
sexually available unless they expressly indicate otherwise.76 
 
promotes the conservative agenda by restricting sexuality in the workplace); 
Neacsu, supra note 31, at 651 (arguing that sexual harassment law has facilitated 
“anti-sexual hysteria” that discredits sexual expression and reaffirms the traditional 
notion of sex as subordinating and exploiting women). 
 71. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (stating the 
frequently repeated maxim that “[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is 
that the alleged sexual advances were ‘unwelcome’”). 
 72. Since sexually harassed employees and sexual harassment plaintiffs are 
overwhelmingly female, this article will refer to the victim as “she” and “her” 
throughout. 
 73. See Elsie Mata, Title VII Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment Sexual 
Harassment Claims: Changing the Legal Framework Courts Use to Determine Whether 
Challenged Conduct is Unwelcome, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 830 & nn.224–27 
(noting courts’ consideration of plaintiffs’ sexual conversations, fantasies, and 
histories, at and away from work, as relevant to determining unwelcomeness). 
 74. A number of commentators have criticized the theory and practice of 
unwelcome conduct inquiries.  See, e.g., Janine Benedet, Hostile Environment Sexual 
Harassment Claims and the Unwelcome Influence of Rape Law, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
125, 174 (1995); Susan Deller Ross, Proving Sexual Harassment: The Hurdles, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1451 (1992); Joan S. Weiner, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual 
Harassment Law: Its History and a Proposal for Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 
626–28 (1997). 
 75. Proof of unwelcomeness focuses on what the harassee did, not what she 
may have felt about it. 
 76. See Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution: Becoming 
Respectable, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1220, 1243–47 (1999) (connecting the “stereotypical 
notion that a working woman was sexually available” with the evidence of a 
13
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C. Progressive Treatment of Unwelcomeness – Undermining Bias and 
Promoting Justice 
Twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court first 
recognized hostile environment sexual harassment as a legitimate 
claim in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,77 but women continue to 
experience these types of inequitable working conditions.78  The 
goal of eliminating workplace harassment remains unfulfilled 
despite the availability of legal action.  Recent studies show a large 
percentage of women still encounter sexual harassment at work.79  
Most women do not sue.80  The unwelcomeness element 
disadvantages women who do seek to enforce their right to a 
workplace free of sexual harassment.81  By reinforcing assumptions 
about sexuality and power without open examination, the 
framework permits men to continue asserting that women invited 
their sexual conduct or overtures.82  Progressive trends in the 
interpretation of this element could help mitigate the tendency to 
reinforce traditional gender stereotypes and inequalities. 
A progressive take on the unwelcomeness element is to 
eliminate the requirement altogether, an idea proposed by 
 
complainant’s provocative speech and dress approved as relevant to the 
welcomeness determination by Meritor). 
 77. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). 
 78. See Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-Clark, The Changing Nature of 
Employment-Related Sexual Harassment: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Government, 
1978–1994, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 443, 443–45 (2004) (citing studies 
concluding that half of all women experience sexual harassment at some point 
during their working lives).  Over ninety percent of reported cases involve men 
harassing women.  DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX, THE DENIAL OF GENDER 
INEQUALITY 97 (1997). 
 79. Mata, supra note 73, at 824–25 nn.193–95 (noting that sexual harassment 
in employment “remains widespread, even epidemic, yet underreported”). 
 80. Only a small percentage of women who experience workplace sexual 
harassment initiate formal claims.  See, Phoebe A. Morgan, Risking Relationships: 
Understanding the Litigation Chances of Sexually Harassed Women, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
67, 68 (1999) (citing surveys conducted in 1981, 1988, and 1994 showing that 
forty-two percent to forty-four percent of female federal employees report legally 
actionable conduct, while only seven percent file formal claims). 
 81. See Mata, supra note 73, at 793–94 (criticizing the current analysis of 
unwelcome conduct as unfairly perpetuating stereotypes about women and 
placing plaintiffs at a disadvantage during litigation). 
 82. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Whose Story is it Anyway?  Feminist and Antiracist 
Appropriations of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON 
ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 427 
(Toni Morrison ed., 1992)). 
14
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numerous commentators.83  Since unwelcome conduct is a major, if 
not essential, component of sexual harassment doctrine, ceasing to 
recognize it as a requirement would constitute a major departure 
from tradition and precedent.  Another suggested approach is to 
remove the inquiry as an element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case 
and reconfigure it as an affirmative defense that defendants would 
have the burden to establish.84 
A less radical alternative would be to interpret the 
unwelcomeness standard in a manner that recognizes the need to 
overcome biased traditional attitudes, to promote equality in the 
workplace, and to improve the delivery of justice to the less-
empowered member of our society.  This interpretation would 
explicitly take issue with the inherent assumptions that bind 
women to the roles society required them to play in the past.  Two 
particular means of dealing progressively with the unwelcomeness 
requirement would fit within this rubric: establishing formal, 
protective rules similar to the civil “rape shield” provided by 
Federal Rule of Evidence 412, and interpreting all proffered 
evidence of unwelcomeness in ways that reframe and reform 
stereotypes about women’s roles and permissible behavior.  Each of 
these two efforts, discussed below, would incorporate the 
progressive values of facilitating departures from traditionally 
entrenched biases that inherently put women in the workplace at a 
disadvantage.  Published and unpublished Minnesota court 
decisions reveal some progressive and some not-so-progressive 
aspects in their treatment of unwelcomeness. 
III.  MINNESOTA – ‘YA NOT QUITE SURE, ‘YA ALMOST BETCHA? 
Minnesota has been identified as a politically progressive 
 
 83. Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
445, 449–501 (1997) (proposing a new standard based on “the respectful 
person”); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)Welcome Conduct and the Sexually Hostile 
Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 733, 786 (2002) (arguing for the elimination of the 
unwelcome conduct element in plaintiff’s prima facie case, but the retention of 
welcomeness as evidence going to damages); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 813, 831 (1991) (arguing for the elimination of the unwelcome conduct 
element as “doctrinally gratuitous and personally humiliating for women”); Paul 
N. Monin, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual History in Sexual 
Harassment Claims under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 412, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 1155, 1191 (1995).  But see  Franke, supra note 70, at 746 (criticizing 
commentators who advocate eliminating the requirement of unwelcome conduct). 
 84. See Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual 
Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 525 (1994). 
15
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state.85  The state showed leadership and initiative on progressive 
issues such as child welfare,86 healthcare for the poor,87 
environmental policy,88 promotion of public education,89 and 
criminal sentencing reform.90  In the area of employment, the 
state’s laws were frequently on the forefront of promoting social 
justice and protecting the less powerful.91  In fact, the enactment of 
Minnesota’s fair employment laws preceded Title VII.92   
Because women who experience workplace sexual harassment 
 
 85. See, e.g., Walter F. Mondale, Reflections on Fifty Years of Progress in Civil 
Rights, Liberties, and Participation, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (referring to 
Minnesota as “a state that has been on the cutting edge of progressive change for 
so many years”).  See also Michael Naughton, The Corporation as a Community of 
Work: Understanding the Firm within the Catholic Social Tradition, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 
33, 68 n.108 (2006) (“Minnesota, despite the cold, has a high quality of life in part 
because of the progressive character of its people in creating highly participative 
companies which also participate in solving the problems of the community.”). 
 86. H.J. Cummins, Kids Really Do Count in Minnesota, Report Says, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), June 20, 2000, at 1A (crediting state’s progressive policies as 
helping support poor families and improve child welfare). 
 87. See Allison Cendali, Implementation of the Children’s Health Insurance Program: 
HHS, States, and Lessons for National Health Reform, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 673–74 
(1998) (describing Minnesota health care reform, including insurance for low-
income persons); Catherine T. Dunlay & Peter A. Pavarini, 1993 Managed 
Competition Theory as a Basis for Health Care Reform, 27 AKRON L. REV. 141, 169–71 
(1993) (same). 
 88. See Stephanie Adams, Wind Power in Minnesota, POSITIVELY MINNESOTA 
(Minn. Dept. of Employment and Economic Development), Dec. 2001/Jan. 2002,  
http://www.deed.state.mn.us/lmi/publications/trends/0102/wind.htm 
(describing development of wind energy policy). 
 89. Anna Lisa Garcia, The Paper School House: The “Business” of Texas Charter 
Schools and Their Effect on the Minority Student Population, 5 SCHOLAR 259, 289–90 
(2003) (noting that Minnesota was on the forefront of the development of charter 
schools and included provisions designed to protect racial balance, to mitigate 
costs for low-income students, and to include children with disabilities). 
 90. “Minnesota was the first jurisdiction to implement legally binding 
sentencing guidelines developed by an independent sentencing commission.”  
Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 32 CRIME & JUST. 131 (2005) 
(identifying Minnesota’s progressivism as a factor allowing the state’s guidelines to 
be created). 
 91. Minnesota is one of twenty-three states with a higher minimum wage than 
required by federal law. National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www. 
ncsl.org/programs/employ/stateminimumwages2006.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 
2006).  Minnesota provides a hospitable forum for plaintiffs in whistleblower cases.  
Peter Gray & Andrew E. Tanick, Fresh Incentives to Whistle While You Work: 
Whistleblower Claims after the Abraham and Anderson-Johanningmeier Cases, 59 BENCH & 
B. MINN. 23 (Apr. 2002).  See also MINN. STAT. § 363A.01 (2004) (prohibiting 
employment and other types of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
and gender identity). 
 92. Sheila Engelmeier & Jonathan J. Hegre, The Deepening Divide: Minnesota 
and Federal Employment Laws, 58 BENCH & B. MINN. 21, 21–22 (Apr. 2001). 
16
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in Minnesota can choose to bring their claims in either state or 
federal court, both jurisdictions are considered in this article.  In 
deciding where to file claims, harassment plaintiffs and their 
attorneys will weigh, among other factors, the directions taken by 
state appellate courts and the federal circuit court, which for 
Minnesota is the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Minnesota 
courts interpreting the state anti-discrimination statutes frequently 
reference and rely upon federal case law.93 
In Minnesota, as in all other states,94 a sexual harassment 
claimant must establish that the complained-of conduct was 
unwelcome.95  The interpretation of unwelcome conduct under the 
Minnesota Human Rights Act also frequently references federal 
decisional law.96  Minnesota state cases reiterate the federal 
articulation of unwelcome conduct: that “the employee did not 
solicit or invite it, and the employee regarded the conduct as 
undesirable or offensive.”97  Both state and federal courts in 
Minnesota have a mixed record on promoting progressive change 
in handling alleged evidence of “unwelcome conduct.” 
 
 93. See Cont’l Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. 1980) 
(confirming that the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) is properly 
interpreted with reference to federal Title VII decisions).  There are some 
differences between state and federal standards.  See Hollen v. USCO Distrib. 
Servs., Inc., No. Civ. 02-1119, 2004 WL 234408, at *4 n.4 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2004) 
(noting that MHRA standards for vicarious liability for supervisor harassment do 
not incorporate standards established by recent federal decisions); cf. 17 STEPHEN 
F. BEFORT, MINN. PRACTICE SERIES: EMPLOYMENT LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.8(d) (2d 
ed. 2005) (stating that although the employer liability for supervisor harassment 
has not been directly decided under the MHRA, Minnesota courts will probably 
adopt the federal standard (incorporating the Faragher/Ellerth decisions)).  See also 
Engelmeier & Hegre, supra note 92, at 22 (noting differences between federal and 
state law, such as that Minnesota does not explicitly differentiate between 
harassment by supervisors and harassment by co-workers when determining an 
employer’s vicarious liability). 
 94. Jennifer Ann Dobrac, Sex and the Workplace: “Consenting” Adolescents and a 
Conflict of Laws, 79 WASH. L. REV. 471, 490 (2004) (stating that unwelcome conduct 
is an element of plaintiff’s prima facie case in each state’s fair employment laws). 
 95. MINN. STAT. § 363A.01, subdiv. 43 (2004).  See also Cummings v. Koehnen, 
568 N.W.2d 418, 424 (Minn. 1997) (stating sexually harassing conduct must be 
unwelcome). 
 96. Halvorson v. Conseco Fin. Corp., No. Civ. 011774, 2002 WL 31371938, at 
*7 n.5 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2002) (assuming that state and federal standards are the 
same in determining whether conduct is unwelcome); Miles v. DDF, Inc., No. A03-
1376, 2004 WL 1049286, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 2004) (referencing federal 
case law in analyzing MHRA claim of unwelcome conduct). 
 97. Myers v. State, No. C4-99-855, 2000 WL 2620, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 
2000) (quoting Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 565 (8th Cir. 
1992)). 
17
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A. Establishment of Protective Formal Rules of Evidence 
The unwelcomeness inquiry provides defendants in any 
jurisdiction with avenues to intimidate and denigrate the harassed 
employee during both pre-trial and trial phases of a case.  
Questions posed during discovery contain barely veiled 
insinuations about her lack of chastity or other ways in which she 
“asked for” whatever harassment she received.  Opportunistic 
defense attorneys98 seek to obtain and introduce evidence of 
plaintiffs’ past sexual partners,99 abortions,100 pornography 
consumption,101 and work as nude models.102  While it may shock a 
harassment victim when the proceeding becomes focused on her 
behavior,103 many defendants quickly understand the potential 
advantages of counterattack.104 
 
 98. “They want to show that the plaintiff is a nut or a slut.”  Monin, supra note 
83, at 1155 (quoting plaintiffs’ attorney Phillip Kay).  The “nuts or sluts” defense 
strategy tells a story that the complaining woman is too promiscuous to sexually 
harass and/or too unbalanced to be believed.  Id.  See also SUSAN ESTRICH, SEX AND 
POWER, 179, 185 (2000) (referencing “the ‘nuts and sluts defense’”). 
 99. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Dep’t of Corr. of Okla., 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir. 
1988) (holding that evidence of plaintiff’s sexual history is not probative of 
whether she welcomed sexual advances at work); Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 
481 (D. Utah 1987) (prohibiting discovery of plaintiff’s past sexual partners of 
which the harasser was unaware). 
 100. See, e.g., Nichols v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that sexual harassment 
plaintiff had undergone an abortion).  See also Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., 27 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
 101. See, e.g., Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing effort by 
defendant employer to question plaintiff about her viewing of pornography); 
Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding 
that trial court properly excluded evidence regarding her consumption of 
pornography). 
 102. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 955 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(discussing the admission of evidence that plaintiff had, on her own time, posed 
nude for a national magazine); Thoreson v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 59 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. 1085  (BNA) (1990), aff’d 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 955 (BNA) (1992) 
(holding that nude model does not automatically welcome workplace sexual 
harassment). 
 103. In the author’s experience as a practicing attorney, clients in sexual 
harassment cases are astonished when the inquiry shifts away from the wrongful 
conduct of their harassers and fixes on their behavior, with obvious connotations 
of sin and transgression. 
 104. As allegedly stated by one well-known defendant: 
If any woman ever breathed a word, I’ll make her pay so dearly that she’ll 
wish she’d never been born.  I’ll rake her through the mud, bring up 
things in her life and make her so miserable that she’ll be destroyed.  
And besides, she wouldn’t be able to afford the lawyers I can, or endure it 
18
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This strategy of accentuating any signs of sexuality,105 in order 
to depict the victim as promiscuous and immoral, replicates tactics 
successfully used by defendants in rape cases.106  There, the 
purported use of such evidence was to establish the defense of 
consent, but the real agenda was manipulating commonly held 
stereotypes about women in order to malign the victim. 
Because criminal “rape shield” provisions now provide a layer 
of protection from such abuses, parties who seek to impugn the 
victim of a sex crime must satisfy a higher threshold of probative 
value before presenting evidence about her107 sexual history.108  
Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 412 in 1978 to protect 
victims of rape and criminal sexual assault from degrading cross-
examinations about their sexual histories and to prevent rape trials 
from becoming inquisitions into the morality of the victims.109  As 
stated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals: 
 
financially as long as I can.  And nobody would believe her, it’d be her 
word against mine, and who are they going to believe?  Me or some 
unstable woman making outrageous accusations.  They’d see her as some 
psycho, someone unstable.  Besides, I’d never make the mistake of 
picking unstable crazy girls like that. 
EXTRA! UPDATE, (a Bimonthly Newsletter of FAIR), Dec. 2004, at 4 (quoting 
allegations of comments made by defendant Bill O’Reilly, as contained in a lawsuit 
filed by O’Reilly Factor producer Andrea Mackris in November 2004). 
 105. Even ordinarily innocuous behavior by a woman can be translated into 
sexual solicitation.  See LEE MADIGAN & NANCY GAMBLE, THE SECOND RAPE: SOCIETY’S 
CONTINUED BETRAYAL OF THE VICTIM 102–03 (1991) (“[the defense attorney] kept 
talking about how I wear shorts when I water my lawn--like I was a prostitute and 
sending out invitations.”). 
 106. ESTRICH, supra note 98, at 179.  The use of past sexual history evidence to 
persuade a jury that a victim more than likely consented to rape or sexual assault is 
devastating to both prosecution and complainant.  See CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE 
HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 41 (1992); 
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 254 (1966); Marah deMeule, 
Note, Privacy Protections for the Rape Complainant: Half a Fig Leaf, 80 N.D. L. REV. 
145, 148–49 (2004) (citing Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and 
Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 764, 796–97 
(1986)). 
 107. Although both women and men are victims of sex crimes, women are the 
subject of this type of violence far more frequently than men. 
 108. Every state now has a criminal rape shield, embodied in either a statute or 
rule of evidence.  deMeule, supra note 106, at 146.  State rape shields resulted 
from the same basic impetus as the federal shield: an intersection that arose 
during the 1970s between increased awareness of violence against women, feminist 
advocacy to improve the legal treatment of rape complainants, and a strong “law 
and order” political culture.  Id. at 147–50. 
 109. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note (quoting testimony of Rep. 
Holtzman during discussion preceding passage of H.R. 4727, which enacted Rule 
412, and citing 124 CONG. REC. H11944 (1978)). 
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The essential insight behind the rape shield statute is that 
in an age of post-Victorian sexual practice, in which most 
unmarried young women are sexually active, the fact that 
a woman has voluntarily engaged in a particular sexual 
activity on previous occasions does not provide 
appreciable support for an inference that she consented to 
engage in this activity with the defendant on the occasion 
on which she claims that she was raped.  And allowing 
defense counsel to spread the details of a woman’s sex life 
on the public record not only causes embarrassment to 
the woman but by doing so makes it less likely that victims 
of rape will press charges.110 
In a surprisingly forward-thinking move,111 Congress modified 
the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1994 to provide similar 
protections in civil cases involving sexual misconduct.112  Rule 412 
 
 110. Sandoval v. Acevedo, 996 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing the 
Illinois criminal rape shield protections). 
 111. Congress actually rejected the Supreme Court’s position that the sexual 
background of a harassment plaintiff is “obviously relevant.”  Weiner, supra note 
74, at 636–37. 
 112. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 states: 
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible.  
The following evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal 
proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided 
in subdivisions (b) and (c): 
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in 
other sexual behavior. 
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual 
predisposition. 
(b) Exceptions.   
. . . 
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or 
sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is 
otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value 
substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of 
unfair prejudice to any party.  Evidence of an alleged victim's 
reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by 
the alleged victim. . . . 
(c) Procedure to determine admissibility. 
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b) must -- 
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically 
describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is 
offered unless the court, for good cause requires a different 
time for filing or permits filing during trial;  and 
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim 
or, when appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or 
representative. 
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must 
conduct a hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a 
20
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was amended so that it applies to civil matters involving “alleged 
sexual misconduct.”113  The Rule imposes a presumption that 
evidence offered to prove a victim’s “other sexual behavior” (such 
as physical conduct, fantasies, dreams) or “alleged . . . sexual 
predisposition” (including mode of dress, speech, life-style) is 
inadmissible.114  Congress intended the amendment “to safeguard 
the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential 
embarrassment, and sexual stereotyping that is associated with 
public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of 
sexual innuendo into the factfinding process.”115  The Rule allows 
for exceptions when the proponent can establish that the probative 
value of the evidence significantly outweighs possible harm to the 
victim.116 
Several federal circuits recognize the 1994 amendments as 
applying to sexual harassment cases.117  The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which has jurisdiction over any appeals of Minnesota 
Federal District Court decisions, has refused to issue a holding 
directly on the issue.118  Recently, the Eighth Circuit implied that 
the Rule covers sexual harassment matters, but found “no danger 
of harm or prejudice,” despite the trial court’s refusal to hold the 
required in camera hearing following objections based on Rule 
 
right to attend and be heard.  The motion, related papers, and the 
record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal unless 
the court orders otherwise. 
FED. R. EVID. 412. 
 113. The amendment was made despite opposition from the Supreme Court.  
Aiken, supra note 48, at 564 (examining the development of Rule 412). 
 114. FED. R. EVID. 412 (a)(1)–(2); FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note 
to 1994 Amendments. 
 115. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 Amendments. 
 116. FED. R. EVID. 412.  See also FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 
1994 Amendments.  To fit within the exception, the probative value of the 
evidence must “substantially outweigh[ ] the danger of harm to any victim and of 
unfair prejudice to any party.”  FED. R. EVID. 412 (b)(2) (reversing the usual 
presumption of admissibility set forth in FED. R. EVID. 403, which provides that 
relevant evidence may be excluded if the probative value is substantially 
outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, misleading jury, undue 
delay, waste of time, or cumulative evidence). 
 117. B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that Federal Rule 412 applies to sexual harassment lawsuits); Wolak v. Spucci, 217 
F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 
F.3d 848, 855–56 (1st Cir. 1998) (same). See also Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 
177 F.R.D. 48, 50 n.4 (D.D.C. 1997) (referring to advisory committee’s note as 
making clear that Rule 412 applies to victims of sexual harassment). 
 118. Warren v. Prejean, 301 F.3d 893, 906 (8th Cir. 2002); Beard v. Flying J, 
Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 801 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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412.119 
Few states have similarly amended their rape shield statutes to 
protect civil litigants.120  Where civil shields do exist, some are so 
narrow they apply only in special circumstances: for example, 
Colorado’s evidence law provides privacy only to sexual assault (not 
harassment) plaintiffs alleging harm from persons in professional 
roles such as medical professionals or clergy.121  The language of 
the few civil shields encompassing sexual harassment reflects their 
foundation in the context of criminal evidence rules and the 
influence of the federal shield.  For example, California’s Evidence 
Code shields sexual history evidence in civil actions alleging “sexual 
harassment, sexual assault, or sexual battery.”122  This language is 
similar to that of Hawaii’s Rule 412, protecting complainants in 
“sexual offense and sexual harassment cases,”123  Iowa’s shield for 
those seeking damages from “sexual abuse”124 and Maine’s shield 
for those complaining of “sexual misconduct.”125 
After Meritor, women were placed in the position of having to 
 
 119. Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 2006) (“While 
we agree that the district court erred in mischaracterizing this evidence as non-
Rule 412 evidence in the first instance, there was no danger of harm or prejudice 
to Wilson or any other party, and the district court correctly determined that it was 
admissible as relevant to the issues raised by Wilson’s claims.”). 
 120. Only California, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, and Maine have state law rape 
shield-type protections that expressly extend into the civil arena.  See infra notes 
121–125.  See also Lewis B. Gainer, The Missouri Human Rights Act is the Law of Choice 
for Sexual Harassment Victims’ Privacy, 60 J. MO. B. 20 (Jan.–Feb. 2004) (arguing that 
more states should provide civil shields). 
 121. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-131 (West 2004). 
 122. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1106 (West 2006).  California’s shield prohibits all 
opinion evidence, reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of 
sexual conduct unless a) plaintiff alleges loss of consortium as an injury; b) the 
evidence concerns plaintiff’s conduct with the respondent; c) plaintiff herself or 
her witnesses introduce such evidence, thereby opening up cross-examination; or, 
d) evidence is used for impeachment per other evidence rules.  Id. 
 123. HAW. R. EVID. 412.  Hawaii extended its shield to civil cases in 1999.  
Renee Furuta, 1999 Hawai’i Legislative Update, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 323, 330 (2000). 
 124. IOWA R. EVID. 5.412. 
 125. ME. R. EVID. 412.  Maine’s 2000 amendment to its Rule 412 extended it to 
civil cases.  ME. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note.  Maine decided not to 
follow the federal model, but added two provisions of its own drafting.  Id.  The 
amended rule prohibits reputation or opinion evidence of past sexual behavior of 
the plaintiff.  Id.  However, the court is given broad discretion to allow evidence of 
specific sexual conduct ‘only’ if the probative value of such evidence outweighs its 
potential ability to prejudice, confuse, or mislead the jury, and cause ‘unwarranted 
harm’ to the party.  Id.  The Advisory Committee notes offer a very thoughtful 
discussion of these rules, and the careful balancing act, which it hopes that judges 
will follow in admitting such evidence.  Id. 
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explain why their clothing choices did not eliminate their right to 
work without being sexually harassed.126  The enactment of Rule 
412 provides a layer of protection, purporting to ensure that before 
evidence of manner of dress is presented, a judge must agree that 
“its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to 
any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.”127  But in states 
without civil shields, Meritor still governs without formal procedural 
protections.  A party may still use the regular motion in limine 
procedure to argue that evidence of the way a woman dressed is 
unfairly prejudicial and not probative of whether she welcomed 
particular conduct at work; however, Meritor is still good law and 
the safest route for a judge is to allow the evidence to be admitted.  
This reluctance to exclude such evidence, even where civil shields 
are in effect, can be seen in the number of times that reviewing 
courts have held that the failure to hold the required Rule 412(c) 
hearing is harmless error.128 
The amendment of Rule 412 and implementation of similar 
state rules have not eliminated the abuse of sexual background 
information under cover of rebutting unwelcomeness.129  But in 
cases where such rules are followed, the effect has been to promote 
a fair focus on the alleged harassment and away from past activities 
of the plaintiff that are likely to trade on stereotype to unfairly 
prejudice the factfinder.130  Requiring parties who intend to offer 
evidence of a person’s past sexual behavior or predisposition to 
establish that the probative force of the information is significantly 
 
 126. “The opinion of the Court in Meritor asks: Did she ask for it?  Did she 
deserve it because of her clothes and conversation?  Meritor indulges trial judges 
who want to evade their duties with a stereotype.”  Bernstein, supra note 83, at 501 
(proposing a new standard based on “the respectful person”). 
 127. FED. R. EVID. 412 (b)(2). 
 128. See, e.g., Beard v. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 801 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the trial court’s failure to hold Rule 412(c) hearing was harmless because 
plaintiff knew her employer intended to introduce evidence of her sexual conduct 
in the workplace). 
 129. See, e.g., B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(sanctioning defendant for violation of Rule 412(c) order by introducing alleged 
sexual fantasies and practices).  Commentators criticize civil application of Rule 
412 as irreparably inconsistent because it relies upon the discretion of individual 
judges.  Aiken, supra note 48, at 570–81.  Aiken argues for a new civil rule that 
more closely tracks the rule for criminal cases.  Id. at 580. 
 130. See Socks-Brunot v. Hirschvogel Inc., 184 F.R.D. 113, 120–24 (S.D. Ohio 
1999) (articulating that evidence of plaintiff’s prior sexual relationship, 
conversations about oral sex, alleged flirtatious behavior, and use of profanity 
should not have been admitted pursuant to Rule 412 and granting plaintiff’s 
motion for new trial). 
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greater than the danger of harm and unfair prejudice, via an in 
camera hearing, provides a check on the cultural biases that 
otherwise maintain social and economic inequality. 
Minnesota has never considered amending its rape shield131 to 
encompass civil harassment plaintiffs.132  The state’s failure to 
create any formal protective mechanism to shield sexual 
harassment plaintiffs shows a lack of progressive initiative.  
Application of the evidentiary rule limiting the admissibility of 
sexually related conduct of a civil harassment victim is an example 
of government regulation intended to equalize social and legal 
imbalances.  The mechanism of formal rules protects sexual 
harassment victims from lingering social biases and stereotypes that 
prevent the substance of their claims from being heard.133  The lack 
of formal protections for sexual harassment plaintiffs who wish to 
complain about how they were treated at work allows them to be 
intimidated out of pursuing valid claims, perpetuating the social 
and economic inequality of women.  The absence of such 
evidentiary protections, when other jurisdictions have enacted 
them, also implicitly allows and condones the reinforcement of 
traditional biases against sexually autonomous women.  Minnesota 
has not handled the unwelcomeness inquiry as progressively as the 
federal judicial system or the several states that have added rape 
shield-type protections for victims in civil sexual misconduct suits.134 
B. Reframing and Reforming Stereotypes About Women, Sex, and Desire 
The notion that women who have engaged in some sexual 
conduct in the past may reasonably be perceived to have invited all 
other sexual conduct is present in several other variations that are 
often relied upon and reinforced as the unwelcome conduct 
 
 131. Minnesota has had a criminal rape shield law since 1975.  See MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.347 (2004). 
 132. Conversation with Peter Thompson, Professor of Law, Hamline University 
School of Law, Chair of the Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee on 
Rules of Evidence, in St. Paul, MN (June 7, 2006).  Mr. Thompson also noted that 
Minnesota’s Rules of Evidence are not modeled after the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
 133. The rule’s reliance on judicial discretion and the risk that judges will be 
seduced by stereotype are problematic.  See Aiken, supra note 48, at 570–81.  Still, a 
procedural rule that plaintiffs can assert is preferable to the absence of any such 
rule, which could be deemed to signify that state’s intentional unwillingness to 
limit such evidence. 
 134. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1106 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
25-131 (West 2004). 
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requirement plays out in litigation.  As sexual harassment disputes 
are argued through the court system, some themes underlying the 
interpretation of the victim’s conduct as “welcoming” emerge. 
The structure of the inquiry itself reinforces the notion that 
women who engage in paid employment in the workforce may be 
assumed to potentially invite sexual overtures unless they overtly 
indicate otherwise.  Abandoning the “separate sphere” of the home 
is used as a proxy for past sexual conduct.  Included within this 
notion is the unstated, but overarching, presumption that all 
women are open to potential sexual conduct with men.  Thus, 
women who fail to adhere to the norms for expected feminine 
behavior are viewed as having “asked for” the harassment they 
received.  This interpretation creates a penalty for non-conforming 
behavior, rendering some sexual behavior an invitation for 
unlimited, even abusive, sexual conduct.  The same assumptions 
transform sexual behavior with certain persons to an invitation 
extended to all other persons.  Likewise, women who do not make 
formal complaints about the harassment and women who treat the 
harasser in friendly ways are penalized for violating behavioral 
expectations.  A sideline theme in several Minnesota decisions is 
the notion that some claims of unwelcome harassment are actually 
mere manifestations of regret or ambivalence about sexual 
encounters.135 
The presence of each of these anti-progressive assumptions in 
sexual harassment case law is explored below, followed by an 
examination of the extent to which Minnesota plaintiffs can 
anticipate that their courts will disavow traditional stereotypes that 
perpetuate the social inequality of women. 
1. Good Girls Don’t – Stereotypes and Assumptions Based on the 
Impropriety of Certain Conduct by Women 
Progressive treatment of unwelcomeness would reject theories 
 
 135. See infra notes 204–08 and accompanying text.  The other pattern noted 
in the Minnesota decisions analyzing unwelcomeness is the frequency of 
unpublished opinions.  See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 142, 152, 174, 178, 182, 
188–89, 191–92.  This may reflect a feeling on the part of the courts that each 
decision should be made based very closely on the specific facts at hand, such that 
allowing them to become published precedent creates a false impression as to the 
boundaries of the law.  On the other hand, the lack of clear precedent leaves 
plaintiffs vulnerable to fear and intimidation, since there are no reliable 
boundaries for admissible or inadmissible evidence with regard to the issue of 
unwelcomeness. 
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based on outdated stereotypes and assumptions about the way 
women should or should not behave.  Traditional norms for female 
behavior prohibited sexual expression and required women to hide 
their sexuality.  Respectable women did not engage in sexually 
open or expressive ways, and if they did, such women were deemed 
to have invited an entire universe of sexual overtures from others.  
In other words, because the woman violated standardized 
behavioral norms restricting female sexuality, she provoked the 
harassing conduct and lost the right to complain when it occurred.  
When the unwelcomeness inquiry critiques the female employee’s 
behavior for signs that she invited the harassment, any deviation 
from the traditional role of a “good girl” can be argued as evidence 
that the conduct was welcome.  Perpetuation of these norms forces 
women to choose between relinquishing their individual rights with 
regard to sexuality or facing being categorized as too promiscuous 
to merit protection from harassment. 
Progressive doctrine would not require women to cover their 
sexuality to avoid inviting sexual advances at work.  Women who do 
not abide by the unwritten rules about dress, language, and 
discretion are deprived of a fair process, if not a remedy, since the 
law expressly considers whether they brought the harassment upon 
themselves.  A progressive take on the unwelcomeness 
determination would discard this double standard as entrenching a 
tradition of inequality. 
a. Working Women Are Sexually Available, Unless They 
Unequivocally Indicate Otherwise 
The unwelcomeness doctrine has been justified as necessary 
because women may be interested in sexual and/or romantic 
overtures at any time, including on the job.136  Instead of requiring 
that the alleged harasser establish why he had reason to believe his 
overtures would be welcomed, the law incorporates an assumption 
that any and all women may welcome sexual attention from men at 
work.137  The recipient of the harassment is required to disprove 
 
 136. See Chambers, supra note 83, at 747 (stating the “possibility” that “some 
sex-based workplace conduct may not cause harm has led some courts to assume 
such conduct is welcome until proven otherwise”). 
 137. Louise F. Fitzgerald, Who Says?; Legal and Psychological Constructions of 
Women’s Resistance to Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
97 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (stating that 
“[b]urdening the plaintiff with proving that the man’s behavior was unwelcome 
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this assumption by establishing that her behavior indicated 
otherwise.138 
This aspect of unwelcomeness perpetuates a long history of 
sexually objectifying women, especially those who venture beyond 
their prescribed sphere.  For example, women have been denied 
employment opportunities on the basis that their mere presence in 
the workplace would encourage sexual assaults.139  Despite their 
now common participation in the paid workforce, working women 
continue to be sexualized and their rights evaluated in light of their 
status as sexual objects holding interest to men. 
The stereotype that a woman who works outside the home 
thereby indicates sexual availability is steeped in traditional gender 
roles that disenfranchise women.  The underlying assumption is a 
carryover from the time when women who participated in the 
economic marketplace were viewed as likely to be prostitutes.  
Separate-spheres ideology, ordaining stereotypical female roles and 
behaviors as the natural destiny of women, underlies the law’s 
treatment of women who violate behavioral norms as inviting 
harassment.140  This theory accepted legal regulation of conduct in 
the public sphere of government and business, while viewing 
domestic and family disputes as existing in the private sphere, and 
therefore not properly subject to the purview of law.141  Women 
who work have ventured out of their proper sphere. 
A variety of this theme underlies the basis for some Minnesota 
court decisions.  In one case, a woman who conversed about 
 
assumes that any woman is sexually available to any man, known or unknown—
unless and until she can convince him (and the court) otherwise”). 
 138. Welcomeness is presumed, absent sufficient contrary evidence.  See, e.g., 
Docktor v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 532, 533, 535 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 
(holding overtures by boss were “not . . . clearly unwelcome,” even though female 
employee rejected them), aff’d, 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 139. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (holding that women 
could be excluded from working as prison guards in male penitentiaries). 
 140. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 51, at 163 (“Since [the] ‘paramount 
destiny and mission’ of women is mandated by ‘nature,’ ‘divine ordinance,’ and 
‘the law of the Creator,’ the civil law need not recognize the claims of women who 
deviate from their proper role.”) (critiquing Justice Joseph Bradley’s concurrence 
in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873)). 
 141. Taub & Schneider, supra note 51, at 154–56 (describing traditional lack of 
legal recognition or enforcement of rights in the “private sphere,” in which 
women were once relegated to inhabiting).  See also BARBARA EHRENREICH & 
DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD, TWO CENTURIES OF THE EXPERTS’ ADVICE TO 
WOMEN 12–13 (2005) (connecting the creation of two opposing, separate spheres 
to the rise of the Market economy during the nineteenth century industrialization 
and capitalization). 
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drinking and hot tubs during a business dinner was criticized 
because “she did not do or say ‘anything overtly to tell [the 
harasser] that she was unwilling to participate in sex with him.’”142  
The court’s comment implies that when a woman has a meal with 
business associates and drinking and hot tubs are discussed, she 
needs to indicate that she does not intend to have sex with any of 
her dinner partners.  In another case, the lower court held sexual 
conduct was not unwelcome because “sexual tension” or “requests 
for a romantic relationship” are not sexual harassment.143  By their 
very presence in the workplace, these women were expected to 
encounter some level of sexuality or sexual advances, and it was up 
to them to prove that they did not want them. 
This incorporation of the assumption that women at work may 
be assumed to welcome sexualized conduct from men is especially 
unfair to women who come to work without any interest in 
sexualized conduct, particularly from men.  Because the 
unwelcomeness doctrine assumes that all women are straight,144 it 
frequently overlooks the possibility that some women are lesbians, 
or are otherwise not interested in sexual conduct from colleagues.  
A progressive interpretation of unwelcomeness would not assume 
all women are straight, which marginalizes sexual minorities and 
essentializes women. 
Progressive treatment of the unwelcome conduct inquiry 
would facilitate a workplace without harassment on the basis of sex, 
understanding the individual and societal benefit that such 
regulation has.  Progressive doctrine would unapologetically seek 
this goal as an example of where government can do good.  
Progressive treatment of unwelcomeness would refuse to condone 
traditional notions about women who earn money by working 
outside the home.  Such analysis would depart from the assumption 
that all women are sexually available at work, absent outward 
indications either way. 
 
 142. Halvorson v. Conseco Fin. Corp., No. Civ. 011774RHKAJB, 2002 WL 
31371938, at *8 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2002). 
 143. Petersen v. Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency, No. C7-94-510, 1994 WL 
455699, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1994) (reversing the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment on three out of four causes of action). 
 144. See Mary Coombs, Title VII and Homosexual Harassment After Oncale: Was It a 
Victory?, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 113, 147 (1999) (noting that under the 
unwelcomeness framework, women are “presumed to be heterosexual and 
therefore to find at least some sexual talk by some men welcome”). 
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b. All or Nothing – Expressing Some Sexual Openness or 
Participating in Vulgarity 
The unwelcomeness requirement connotes that women who 
engage in some sexual behavior are therefore amenable to any 
other sexualized conduct, absent affirmative proof to the 
contrary.145  Suggestive banter and innuendo can be argued to 
welcome escalated conduct, such as obscene gestures, physical 
touching, and outright abuse.146  Participation in sexual jokes and 
comments can be found to welcome groping, shoving, and threats 
of violence.147  This aspect of the unwelcome conduct inquiry 
enables plaintiffs to be humiliated and intimidated during pre-trial 
discovery and motions, regardless of whether the evidence is later 
ruled to be inadmissible.148  Even conduct that the harasser did not 
perceive firsthand and activities that the woman engaged in away 
 
 145. See Chambers, supra note 83, at 747 (critiquing the unwelcomeness 
element as “suggest[ing] that a particular employee’s willingness to engage in sex-
based conduct in the workplace justifies assuming that any employee may be open 
to an office romance until that employee makes clear that she is not”). 
 146. Weiner, supra note 74, at 627–28 (“If she acted in a ‘sexually aggressive’ 
way or used ‘sexually-oriented language,’ this is viewed as a justification for 
abuse.”).  See also Ripley v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., No. 04AP-313, 2004 
WL 2361571, at *1–2, *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2004) (agreeing that where a 
woman had engaged in sexual joking, remarked about her breasts, collected 
suggestive cartoons and jokes, did not hide her sexual activities, compared breast 
sizes with a female co-worker, and one day did not wear a bra to work, such 
evidence negated her claim that she did not welcome direct sexual advances from 
co-workers, including lip-licking, daily demands for sex, lifting her skirt, and 
blatantly sexual gestures). 
 147. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486, 491–92 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(noting that plaintiff who had suffered from being punched in the kidneys, 
tickled, handcuffed to various objects in the office, forced to put her head in the 
laps of male co-workers, mocked with an electric cattle prod, dunked into a toilet, 
and maced could not prevail on sexual harassment claim because she participated 
in similar activities since she had told dirty jokes, made sexual comments, showed 
off her abdominal scars, went braless, and gave suggestive gifts to her colleagues); 
Mangrum v. Republic Indus., 260 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1252–53 (N.D. Ga. 2003) 
(stating that plaintiff who engaged in vulgar language, gave massages, and 
exchanged back scratches with co-workers is deemed to have welcomed 
supervisor’s repeated requests for sex and patting her behind), aff’d, 88 F. App’x 
390 (11th Cir. 2003); Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 
1563–64 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that because she engaged in sexual banter, 
plaintiff was deemed to have welcomed the actions of a co-worker who placed his 
penis in her hand), aff’d, 949 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 148. See Katie M. Patton, Note, Unfolding Discovery Issues That Plague Sexual 
Harassment Suits, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 997–98 (2006) (noting effects of discovery 
abuses, including those hinging on disproving unwelcome conduct, in sexual 
harassment litigation). 
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from work can be examined in discovery and proffered by 
defendants as arguably constituting solicitation of sexual conduct 
in the workplace.149  The most regressive trend is where some 
participation in sexual or vulgar activities precludes an employee 
from establishing that other, even escalated, types of sexual 
conduct were unwelcome as a matter of law, depriving the 
employee of the opportunity to present her case to a factfinder. 
A progressive evaluation of whether conduct was unwelcome 
would not interpret some acceptance or expression of sexuality by 
female employees as inviting disproportionate sexual overtures or 
outright abuse in the workplace.150  Also, progressive treatment of 
the law would examine the possibility that the conduct in question 
was engaged in or acquiesced to without inviting or soliciting the 
conduct.  Developments in decisional law should recognize that 
some women may be drawn to engage in responsive behavior 
merely as a way of defending themselves with retorts, as a way of 
fitting in, or out of fear of the consequences of refusing to accede 
to advances.151 
The all-or-nothing premise lingers on in Minnesota trial 
courts, but the appellate court appears unconvinced by it.  In one 
 
 149. See Horney v. Westfield Gage Co., 77 F. App’x 24, 28–30 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(defendants argued on appeal that trial court improperly excluded evidence that 
plaintiff bared her breasts while working at a previous job, which defendants 
contended could establish that sexual comments made by supervisor at 
subsequent job were not unwelcome); Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 955 F.2d 
559, 565 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that because evidence of sexually provocative 
speech or dress is relevant in determining whether conduct was unwelcome, the 
fact that plaintiff posed for nude photos outside of the workplace was relevant; 
plaintiff’s later victory against this holding was marred by the Eighth Circuit’s 
opinion, which agreed that posing nude outside of the workplace was relevant to a 
consideration of the totality of circumstances), rev’d, 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 150. Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting “a 
striking disproportion” between the conduct female employees allegedly 
consented to with other employees and the conduct allegedly committed by the 
defendant harassers). 
 151. See, e.g., James E. Gruber & Michael D. Smith, Women’s Responses to Sexual 
Harassment: A Multivariate Analysis, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 543, 545 
(1995) (stating that women try to defuse workplace sexual harassment by joking 
about it).  Many harassed employees respond in indirect, non-confrontational 
ways, such as by “ignoring the harasser (44%), avoiding the harasser (28%), 
making a joke of the behavior (15%), or going along with the behavior (7%).”  
Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the Construction 
of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 83, 86 n.1 (2005) (quoting U.S. 
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES (1995), http://www. 
mspb.gov/studies/sexhar.pdf). 
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case, conduct had been determined to be not unwelcome as a 
matter of law, based on evidence that the employee had “frequently 
used profanities and engaged in vulgar behavior.”152  Her behavior 
was found to have welcomed the following behavior from her co-
workers as a matter of law: explicit references to sexual activities, 
forcing her head to a male co-worker’s crotch area, showing 
pornographic photos, intruding on her in the bathroom, grabbing 
her thigh, telling her that women belonged at home, giving her 
orders without authority, and threatening her for complaining.153  
Reversing, the appellate court found that the harassment was 
unwelcome, and noted that women who use “foul language or 
sexual innuendo in a consensual setting” do not waive their right to 
a workplace free of harassment.154 
Decisions in Minnesota Federal District Court adhere to the 
principle that unwelcomeness should be determined by the trier of 
fact, regardless of the plaintiff’s participation in name-calling or 
suggestive comments.  In one case, the employer argued that two 
women who participated in name-calling in the workplace had 
welcomed the sexually vulgar conduct of their co-workers.155  The 
court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment and 
held that whether the conduct was unwelcome was an issue of 
disputed fact for trial.156  A more progressive opinion would have 
indicated that even if defendants can establish that the plaintiffs 
engaged in mutual name-calling, it provides scant basis for arguing 
that the plaintiffs welcomed crude sexual drawings, sexual gestures, 
exposure of the genitals, touching of their bodies (including 
breasts), or lewd sexual propositions. 
Similarly, an employer-defendant in another case argued that 
 
 152. Myers v. State, No. C4-99-855, 2000 WL 2620, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 
2000) (quoting uncited underlying district court decision). 
 153. Id. at *3. 
 154. Id. at *2 (quoting Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 963 (8th 
Cir. 1993)). 
 155. Castellanos v. Wood Design, Inc., No. Civ. 03-3416 DWF/JSM, 2005 WL 
41628, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 4, 2005).  The conduct consisted of the following: 1) 
giving the women a drawing of a donkey with human genitals and sexually vulgar 
words inscribed on it; 2) grabbing and exposing themselves; 3) touching or 
attempting to touch the women’s breasts, shoulder, and bellybutton; 4) telling the 
women they should have their underwear removed “and to itch [their] pussies;” 
and 5) calling them names (“bitches,” “cunt,” and “whores”), remarking “touch 
your ass,” “son of a dick,” and “mother fuckers,” and saying they wanted to 
“scratch” the women’s “pussies.”  Id. at *1. 
 156. Id. at *4. 
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because the employee had participated in numerous off-color 
conversations at work, she thereby welcomed the sexual overtures 
and vulgar conduct of her supervisors.157  The court rejected the 
employer’s contention that because she had engaged in vulgar 
language in some situations, the conduct of her supervisors could 
not have been unwelcome to her.158  Her behavior in other contexts 
was found to be relevant to the factual determination as to 
unwelcome conduct, but not sufficient to grant summary 
judgment.159 
But the Eighth Circuit’s commitment to this principle appears 
somewhat compromised and arguably dependent upon the gender 
of the plaintiff.  A three-judge panel held that a female employee’s 
use of offensive language precluded her from establishing that her 
supervisor’s use of the same or similar words was unwelcome as a 
matter of law.160  Judge Lay dissented, stating that the employee’s 
occasional use of swearing in her general communication could 
not constitute welcoming, as a matter of law, the constant repeated 
use of the same or similar words in a significantly different manner, 
one that was directed towards demeaning women.161  Judge Lay 
emphasized that the use of “foul language” in the workplace might 
weigh against a factual finding that sexual harassment was 
unwelcome, but should not bar a claim entirely as a matter of law:162 
“I am unaware of any case that precludes a plaintiff from arguing 
 
 157. Dull v. St. Luke’s Hosp. of Duluth, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1024 (D. Minn. 
1998).  Supervisor misconduct included referencing a picture of a penis, asking 
whether she had PMS, disseminating an off-color joke about gynecologists, 
disseminating a joke about blondes, gesturing toward her breasts and the 
supervisor’s crotch while telling a sexual joke, eying her cleavage and asking 
whether she was trying to arouse him, and telling her that she had nice breasts.  Id. 
at 1024. 
 158. Id. at 1026. 
 159. Id. (“While her conduct in other contexts may otherwise be relevant, it 
does not demonstrate as a matter of law that she was inviting all types of sexually 
explicit statements and conduct.” (citing Burns, 989 F.2d at 963–64)). 
 160. Hocevar v. Purdue Frederick Co., 223 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2000).  The 
decision involved a very thin consensus.  Id.  Judge Beam held that Ms. Hocevar 
was unable to show that her supervisor’s constant references to women as 
“bitches,” “fucking bitches,” and “fat fucking bitches” were unwelcome because 
she had also used the words “bitch” and “fuck” in the workplace.  Id. at 724, 736–
37.  Judge Gibson concurred in the result, writing separately to state, among other 
things, that because Ms. Hocevar admitted using the words, she could not establish 
that her supervisor’s use of the same words was subjectively offensive to her.  Id. at 
740–41. 
 161. Id. at 729–30 (Lay, J., dissenting). 
 162. Id. at 730. 
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that the employer’s constant use of sexually charged language and 
off-color jokes is unwelcome merely because the plaintiff at times 
engaged in swearing.”163 
Judge Lay opined that the circumstances described by the 
employee, including her complaint to management and her need 
for psychological care, were sufficient to establish at trial that the 
harassment was unwelcome and subjectively offensive to her.164  She 
was not permitted that opportunity because her claim was denied 
on summary judgment. 
Just two years later, the Eighth Circuit rejected an employer’s 
argument that a male employee’s use of sexually explicit language 
at work precluded a finding that vulgarities directed at him were 
unwelcome.165  Evidence presented at trial that the employee 
repeatedly complained to management, documented and then 
tried to erase sexual statements about himself, and sustained 
psychological difficulties was found sufficient to support a finding 
that the graffiti was unwelcome.166  Apparently without irony, that 
panel cited to Judge Lay’s dissent in Hocevar for the proposition 
that complaining to management and experiencing fear and 
depression constitute evidence that conduct was unwelcome.167 
c. All About Eve – One’s as Good as the Next 
A similar premise that is reinforced by traditional 
interpretations of the unwelcomeness inquiry is that a woman’s 
sexual conduct with one person tends to show that she welcomed 
sexual conduct with other persons.168  This theory relies upon 
 
 163. Id.  Judge Lay also criticized the majority for ignoring the supervisor’s 
communication of violent threats, vulgar jokes, a sexually explicit audiotape, and 
apparent approval of similar behavior from others at meetings.  Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Beach v. Yellow Freight Sys., 312 F.3d 391, 396–97 (8th Cir. 2002).  The 
complained-of conduct that was allegedly “invited or solicited” by the employee’s 
explicit language consisted of graffiti written throughout the workplace that 
identified him by name, asserted that he was gay, and obscenely accused him of 
engaging in specific sexual activities, including incest and bestiality.  Id. at 394-96. 
 166. Id. at 396-97.  The court agreed that he “neither solicited nor invited it 
and regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive.”  Id. at 396 (quoting Scusa 
v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
 167. Beach, 312 F.3d at 396–67 (citing Hocevar, 223 F.3d at 730). 
 168. See, e.g., Beard v. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 797–98 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(discussing the employer’s contention that supervisor’s conduct, touching the 
plaintiff’s breasts with his body, cooking tongs, and a pen was welcomed because 
plaintiff was alleged to have suggestively touched a male co-worker’s thigh and to 
have frequently used suggestive language at work). 
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traditional requirements of female chastity and the notion of the 
fallen woman.169 
Decisions in many jurisdictions treat this theory as valid, 
emboldening defendants and neutralizing plaintiffs’ efforts to 
preclude the admission of such evidence.  A woman who discusses 
her sex life with one co-worker may be argued to have lost the right 
to complain about sexual inquiries from another co-worker.170  A 
woman who openly engages in a sexual relationship with one co-
worker may be asserted to have welcomed a potential sexual 
relationship with any other co-worker.171  A woman who collects 
sexual jokes and makes comments about her breasts in a discussion 
with a female co-worker may be alleged to have welcomed a male 
co-worker’s propositions and vulgar remarks.172 
By facilitating these types of arguments as potential defenses to 
sexual harassment claims, the unwelcomeness requirement 
supports the assumption that female sexuality is somehow fungible, 
and that a woman’s decision to engage in sexual conduct with a 
man means she will do the same with any other man.173  Minnesota 
courts have acquiesced to this faulty logic on at least one 
occasion.174 
Progressive law, seeking to reform sexist double standards, 
 
 169. See Rachael Knight, From Hester Prynne to Crystal Chambers: Unwed Mothers, 
Authentic Role Models, and Coerced Speech, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 481, 488–89, 
499–520 (2004) (discussing courts’ unfavorable treatment of discrimination claims 
made by women who refused to “cover” (i.e., hide, minimize, or neutralize) the 
fact that they were unmarried and pregnant). 
 170. See, e.g., King v. Town of Hanover, 959 F. Supp. 62, 66 (D.N.H. 1996) 
(explaining that innuendo used by a plaintiff with co-workers was potentially 
relevant to determining whether sexual overtures from a supervisor were 
welcome), aff’d, 116 F.3d 965 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 171. See, e.g., B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1105 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(noting that defendants offered evidence of plaintiff’s sexual comments and 
behavior away from work with other co-workers to establish welcomeness of 
harassment from a co-worker). 
 172. Ripley v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., No. 04AP-313, 2004 WL 
2361571, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2004) (mentioning the effect of plaintiff’s 
use of sexual jokes on unwelcomeness). 
 173. See Chambers, supra note 83, at 747 n.69 (citing Benedet, supra note 74, at 
140) (arguing that investigation of women’s sexual history in harassment matters is 
founded on the idea that “[s]exual acts are . . . essentially fungible for women, 
both as to the partner with whom they engage in them and as to the location in 
which they take place”). 
 174. Gatzke v. Campbell, No. C9-97-507, 1997 WL 757383, at *3 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Dec. 9, 1997) (where defendant argued that because plaintiff had engaged in 
off-color humor with bar staff, sexual overtures from her supervisor were not 
unwelcome). 
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would not assume that a woman’s sexual expression or conduct 
with one person or co-worker invites sexual overtures from any or 
all others.  Some courts in other jurisdictions have overtly rejected 
this theory at the discovery stage, denying the employer motion to 
compel the harassed employee to reveal all sexual relationships she 
may have had with co-workers.175  In doing so, the District Court of 
the District of Columbia articulated that the interpretation of 
welcoming conduct should not be tethered to traditions that 
hobble women, explicitly rejecting the underlying premise of 
defendants’ argument that if a woman was known to have engaged 
in a sexual relationship with one co-worker, it would be reasonable 
to assume that she welcomed other sexual advances at work: 
[T]hat perception would be reasonable only if it fairly 
could be said that a man who learns of a woman’s affair is 
justified in believing that she will be as willing to have a 
sexual relationship with him as she was to have one with 
her lover.  While such a perception might have been 
justified, in men’s minds, in Victorian England and 
Wharton’s “Age of Innocence” in America, when men 
discriminated between the women they married and the 
women they slept with, it has nothing to do with America 
in 1997.  While religious and other leaders condemn it, 
sexual behavior, outside of married life, between 
consenting adults is so common and so commonly 
accepted by the society, that it is absurd to think that any 
man in 1997 can be justified in believing that a woman 
who engages in it is so degraded morally that she will 
welcome his sexual advances without protest.  Since a man 
cannot seriously contend in 1997 that any woman who has 
a sexual relationship with her co-worker is morally 
degraded, justifying his conclusion that she will not resist 
him, he is reduced to arguing that because a woman took 
one co-worker as a lover he is justified in his belief that 
she will accept him and welcome his sexual advances.  
That, in all but his imagination, is non sequitur.176 
The scathing rebuttal continues throughout this opinion, with 
the court sending a very clear signal that it will not tolerate this 
construction of welcoming conduct.177 
 
 175. E.g., Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48, 53 (D.D.C. 1997). 
 176. Id. at 52. 
 177. The expected effect of this opinion would be that parties in sexual 
harassment disputes before this court had, from the date of this opinion, a definite 
idea as to how potential claims of (un)welcome conduct would be viewed by this 
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A similar but more succinct conclusion was reached in a 
Minnesota case where the court of appeals found that the 
employee’s “conversations with her female co-workers did not open 
the door to sexual comments directed at her by her male boss.”178  
The employer’s owner and president had hugged and kissed his 
employee in a back hallway; left a sexually explicit statue and a 
magazine article depicting animal sexual positions on her desk; 
described his son’s genitalia to her; implied that if she had an affair 
with him, she could get a company car; and told her that he loved 
her.179  The employer argued unsuccessfully on appeal that the 
conduct in question was not unwelcome, in part because the 
employee had engaged in conversations of a sexual nature with 
female co-workers.180  To its credit, the Eighth Circuit appears to 
have drawn the line at admitting into evidence only sexualized 
behavior that occurred in the workplace.181 
d. Weighing Conflicts in the Evidence as Establishing 
Welcomeness Per Se 
Courts have determined disputed facts regarding 
welcomeness, revealing a disposition toward recognizing a theory 
of welcomeness per se: if she engaged in the conduct, she must 
have welcomed it.182  These missteps by trial courts have often been 
corrected on appeal.183 
The requirement that a plaintiff establish unwelcomeness, 
 
particular judge. 
 178. Hansen v. Regency Corp., No. C6-95-962, 1996 WL 33116, at *2 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1996). 
 179. Id. at *1. 
 180. Id. at *2. 
 181. See Beard v. Flying J, Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 801–02 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(permitting evidence of sexual behavior that occurred in the workplace); Excel 
Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635, 640–41 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming refusal to allow 
evidence of sexual conduct that occurred away from work). 
 182. See Miles v. DDF, Inc., No. A03-1376, 2004 WL 1049286, at *4 (Minn. Ct. 
App. May 11, 2004) (quoting trial court’s findings of fact on summary judgment, 
which ignored the employee’s statement that she was threatened with the loss of 
her job if she refused to engage in a sexual relationship with her boss and found 
that her involvement in the planning of their sexual encounters negated her 
testimony so “as to leave no doubt as to the factual truth” that she welcomed the 
behavior).  To its credit, the appellate court reversed because the trial court had 
made improper credibility determinations.  Id. at *5–6. 
 183. Id. at *5 (noting that the power disparity between the employee and her 
boss may explain her acquiescence to conduct she claims was unwelcome; 
reversing and remanding sexual harassment claim for trial). 
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instead of requiring harassers to prove affirmatively that their 
conduct was invited, has been stretched to support the argument 
that any evidence that conflicts with the notion of unwelcomeness 
requires a determination that the conduct was not unwelcome.  
Thus, evidence that the plaintiff was friendly or that she eventually 
submitted to the advances has been used as a basis for concluding 
the plaintiff cannot establish unwelcomeness as a matter of law.184  
Such holdings represent a significant departure from the principle 
that the existence of unwelcome conduct must be determined by 
the finder of fact, based on the totality of the circumstances. 
To its credit, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has mostly 
resisted attempts to move the law in this direction, holding that 
trial courts that use conflicting evidence to find against the 
harassed employee have made improper credibility and factual 
determinations concerning the issue of unwelcomeness.185  In one 
case, the trial court had viewed evidence of the employee’s 
submission to a sexual relationship with her boss as so 
overwhelmingly predominating in favor of the employer that 
unwelcome conduct could not be established.186  Disagreeing, the 
appellate court noted “considerable deposition testimony” that her 
boss’s initial overtures were not welcome: she had resisted his first 
kiss, her boss said she would be fired if anyone found out about 
their relationship, she objected to his touching and kissing, she 
told him “no” and pushed him away before they had sex, and at 
first she hated their sexual contacts, but put up with them just to 
keep her job.187  Allowing such conflicts in the evidence to be 
resolved by the finder of fact is pivotal to the construction of 
unwelcomeness as hinging upon context and determinations of 
credibility.188 
 
 184. See, e.g., Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1149 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting 
district court’s ruling that plaintiff’s submission to sexual requests precluded a 
finding of unwelcome conduct as a matter of law). 
 185. See Miles, 2004 WL 1049286, at *5 (reversing summary judgment for the 
employer). 
 186. Id. at *4.  The evidence included the employee’s acquisition of a hotel 
room for the two of them, providing for drinks in the room, taking off her clothes 
before her boss arrived, discussing their sexual relationship with friends and 
coworkers, purchasing and exchanging gifts, arranging for their children to meet, 
and discussing marriage and the possibility of operating the company together.  
Id. at *1–2. 
 187. Id. at *4. 
 188. See also Petrovic v. Ridgeview Country Club, No. C6-01-1474, 2002 WL 
765490, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (reversing judgment that conduct 
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Conversely, the appellate court has rejected efforts by 
defendants to appeal findings of unwelcome conduct, following a 
trial, based on allegedly conflicting friendly or receptive behavior 
on the part of the plaintiff.  In one instance, the court upheld a 
determination that conduct was unwelcome despite the existence 
of some indications of welcomeness.189  Evidence presented at trial 
that the employee had made meals for the employer, discussed her 
personal life, and sent him love letters after she quit “may conflict 
with but does not rebut the prima facie case.”190  Similarly, the court 
of appeals upheld a finding that conduct was unwelcome over 
defendant’s claim that inconsistencies and the cards she sent to 
him and signed “love” proved otherwise.191 
In a recent departure from this stance, however, the appellate 
court upheld a finding that an employee’s allegedly conflicting 
response to harassing conduct precluded her from establishing 
unwelcomeness as a matter of law.192  The employee argued that a 
factfinder should resolve the issue, asserting that her rejection of 
the harasser’s invitation for a Las Vegas trip, her complaints 
concerning that proposal and a suggestive note he sent, her refusal 
to share meals with him, and “her demeanor and disposition” 
would establish that the conduct was unwelcome.193  The appellate 
court refused to allow her to present this evidence, citing her offer 
of a two-block ride after a party, acceptance of candy bars, e-mail 
stating that she “could never be ‘mad’ at” him, and a note 
 
was not unwelcome as a matter of law because the employee had continued to 
work at parties where claimed harassment occurred, and holding that trial court 
had engaged in improper determination of disputed fact of unwelcomeness). 
 189. Schurstein v. Selmer Law Firm, P.A., No. C9-99-530, 1999 WL 732438, at 
*1–2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1999) (holding that it was not clearly erroneous for 
the trial court to find that the employer had sexually harassed his employee by 
making advances, threatening termination when she tried to avoid his phone calls, 
going to her apartment the day after terminating her and initiating sex, and 
rehiring her after that, conditional on her writing a thank you note for her job). 
 190. Id. at *2. 
 191. B.L.L. v. Estate of Heller, No. C0-98-1359, 1998 WL 901757, at *2 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1998) (noting that her trial testimony indicated that she told the 
employer his overtures “were ‘not right,’” tried to avoid his physical advances, and 
changed the subject when he made sexual comments). 
 192. Monson v. N. Habilitative Servs., No. A05-1102, 2006 WL 771919, at *1, *6 
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2006) (upholding summary judgment for the employer). 
 193. Id. at *6.  In addition, she had refused his offer of help getting on her 
coat until the two “were engaged in a ‘tug of war,’” resisted his attempt to hold her 
physically and help her cross an icy walkway, and told him she was not interested 
in going to Las Vegas with him.  Id. at *1. 
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including a smiley face to politely decline his offer of food.194  Based 
on these facts, the appellate court held that her claim of 
unwelcome conduct was “not substantiated by any outward 
manifestations of such an attitude.”195 
If followed, this newer interpretation of the unwelcomeness 
element as impossible to establish where there is some indication 
that the conduct was welcome retreats from the goal of enabling 
plaintiffs to establish unwelcome conduct by presenting the facts 
contextually.  Particularly where such alleged conflicts are merely 
friendly, as opposed to sexually tinged, behavior, this standard 
facilitates continued inequality by converting courtesy and social 
graces into an invitation for sexual advances.196 
Women who adhere to their gender roles by being nice, loyal, 
and nurturing197 can be viewed as having welcomed sexual 
harassment.  This interpretation hinders efforts to rid the 
workplace of harassment by preventing valid claims from moving 
forward.  Behavioral studies show that women are unlikely to 
behave confrontationally when harassed, but instead attempt to 
tolerate or ignore the conduct.198  Such a requirement for 
establishing unwelcomeness contradicts typical behavior by seeking 
evidence that the employee outwardly expressed unfriendliness. 
Evidence that conduct was not unwelcome is frequently 
gleaned from the woman’s treatment of the harasser, with signs of 
friendship, openness, or even ambivalence about the relationship 
interpreted as welcoming sexual overtures.  Courts have considered 
the fact that a woman frequently had lunch with a supervisor and 
“discussed personal matters” as constituting evidence that sexual 
advances were not unwelcome.199 
 
 194. Id. at *6. 
 195. Id. at *7. 
 196. See Weiner, supra note 74, at 630 (noting cases where courts have found “a 
woman’s having lunch with a man, visiting a man in the hospital, and kissing a 
man on the cheek in a posed snapshot relevant to the question of whether a 
woman has invited subsequent harassment and even attempted sexual assault”). 
 197. See Barbara A. Gutek & Bruce Morasch, Sex-Ratios, Sex-Role Spillover, and 
Sexual Harassment of Women at Work, 38 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 55, 58–59 (1982).  In an 
effort to obtain or preserve social acceptance, women typically fulfill the 
stereotypical female role.  Id. 
 198. See, e.g., Gruber & Smith, supra note 151, at 544–46 (citing studies 
concluding that most women do not respond assertively to or formally report 
harassment, but that instead they incorporate various strategies for tolerating it). 
 199. See Kresko v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).  Other 
evidence relied on by the trial and reviewing courts, including that the employee 
wrote a note struggling to define their relationship as involving love or mere 
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In addition, a woman who does not convey a requisite level of 
shock at the harassing conduct may be deemed to have 
experienced conduct that is not unwelcome.  One Minnesota court 
found that a woman who managed to retain her composure in the 
face of harassment, instead of outwardly expressing shock or 
horror, had not experienced unwelcome conduct.200  The trial 
court found that her “comments evinced a sense of humor and 
perspective about the parties that belied her claim of sexual 
harassment.”201 
Some courts have interpreted this requirement as necessitating 
that the harassed employee made some very clear response, after 
the fact, to inform the harasser that the conduct was not wanted.202  
The state agency in charge of investigating discriminatory 
employment practices also appears to countenance this idea.203 
e. Claims of Unwelcome Conduct as Mere Remorse or 
Ambivalence 
Several Minnesota decisions interject the notion that some 
sexual harassment claims are merely based on misgivings over what, 
at the time, were welcome advances.204  This line of thinking brings 
with it the underlying mythology that there is a prevalence of 
fraudulent sexual harassment claims.  In Miles v. DDF, Inc., a 
woman who claimed she was subjected to unwelcome sexual 
advances from her boss was found to have been a “willing and 
active participant” in sexual conduct, and her claim was found to 
be based on regret and her likely honest belief that she had been 
 
friendship, shows less of a non-progressive bias.   Id. at 766. 
 200. Petrovic v. Ridgeview Country Club, No. C6-01-1474, 2002 WL 765490 
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002). 
 201. Id. at *3. 
 202. See Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual 
Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 516 (1994) (discussing Dockter v. Rudolf 
Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
 203. See Klinghagen v. Setterberg, Nos. C6-97-1744, CX-97-1293, 1998 WL 
249028, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 19, 1998) (noting that, according to the 
Minnesota Department of Human Rights, unwelcomeness was unlikely to be 
established because the employee did not let the harasser know his conduct was 
unwelcome). 
 204. See Bernstein, supra note 83, at 500 (stating that “as many commentators 
argue, the rule about ‘welcomeness’ is akin to the common law belief that rape 
claims are often lies that are asserted to nullify past consent: according to the 
prejudice, a woman who is now a plaintiff or a prosecutrix was a willing participant 
when the conduct occurred”). 
40
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/2
 11/21/2006  2:37:24 PM 
2006] SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN MINNESOTA 157 
taken advantage of.205  The implication, left unstated, is that her 
testimony that the advances were unwelcome was in fact dishonest.  
Omitted is an analysis of whether what she regretted was really her 
acquiescence to her boss’s uninvited and unwelcome advances.206  
In another case where the plaintiff was found unable to establish 
unwelcome conduct, the court characterized the plaintiff as 
considering the advances “unwelcome in retrospect.”207 
A second theme that should also be noted is the notion that 
the harassed employee’s mixed or ambivalent feelings about the 
harasser preclude a finding of unwelcomeness.  One Minnesota 
court was comfortable affirming a finding that no sexual 
harassment occurred because the evidence indicated that either 
the employee welcomed her supervisor’s advances, or she had 
“ambivalent feelings” about them.208 
More progressive developments in the law would find that an 
employee who is ambivalent about sexual conduct in the workplace 
has not sufficiently invited or solicited the conduct for it to be 
deemed welcome.  Determinations of whether particular conduct 
was unwelcome would not devolve into speculation about whether 
the claim was brought because an employee now regretted being 
taken advantage of by her boss. 
2. Complaint as the Sine Qua Non – Behavioral Assumptions Not 
Borne Out by Research 
Although an employee is not required to complain about the 
conduct in order to establish that sexual harassment has 
occurred,209 assessment of unwelcomeness in the courts is 
frequently tied to whether the employee complained and, if so, to 
 
 205. No. EM 02-20129, 2004 WL 3563777, at *3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 
2004). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Halvorson v. Conseco Fin. Corp., No. Civ. 011774RHKAJB, 2002 WL 
31371938, at *8 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2002). 
 208. Kresko  v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 209. However, where an employer provides an internal complaint process, an 
employee may be required to attempt to use it in order to impose liability on the 
employer.  See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment – 
Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner and Bisom-
Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 170–71, 175 (criticizing the affirmative 
defense recognized by the Supreme Court in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775 (1998) and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) where 
an employee does not use an employer’s internal complaint procedures). 
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whom.210  An additional assumption, often affirmed in the law, is 
that if conduct is truly unwelcome, the complaint will be made in a 
direct manner using formal procedures.211  Failure to complain, 
complaining long after the harassing events have occurred,212 or 
raising the issue in an indirect manner213 are thus considered 
evidence that the conduct was welcome. 
Women, however, usually do not complain when they 
experience sexual harassment at work.214  Additionally, the racial 
status and cultural background of the parties involved may make it 
less likely that the woman will complain.215 
Minnesota courts show signs of clinging tightly to the notion 
that if the conduct was truly unwelcome, the employee would have 
formally complained to the employer.  In one case, an intern 
asserted that her supervisor was harassing her by commenting on 
how she looked in a sweater, by physically attacking her while they 
were at her house for lunch, and by engaging in “mutual kissing 
and petting.”216  The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed a verdict 
 
 210. See Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 632 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(finding that when plaintiff failed to complain about the conduct, it was not 
determined to be unwelcome); Fitzgerald, supra note 137, at 100–01 (“[M]aking a 
formal complaint appears to be the legal sine qua non of an ‘appropriate’ 
response.”). 
 211. See, e.g., Paraohao v. Bankers Club, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (S.D. 
Fla. 2002). (determining that conduct was not unwelcome in part because 
complaint was made informally, to a co-worker, and that initial, more formal 
discussions with management left out certain details); Weinsheimer v. Rockwell 
Int’l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (providing that conduct was 
not unwelcome in part because plaintiff reported harassment in casual 
conversation with supervisor), aff’d, 949 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1991); Kouri v. Liber. 
Servs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-00582-A, 1991 WL 50003, at *7–8 (E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 1991) 
(noting that plaintiff failed to report harassment through formal channels), aff’d, 
960 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 212. See Paraohao, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (finding that conduct was not 
unwelcome as a matter of law in part because the plaintiff did not complain until 
nearly four months after she started working with the harasser); Weinsheimer, 754 F. 
Supp. at 1564 (finding that conduct was not unwelcome where reported months 
afterwards); Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587, 608 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (holding 
that a three-month delay in reporting did not support actionable harassment). 
 213. See Weinsheimer, 754 F. Supp. at 1564 (focusing on the delay and the fact 
that plaintiff reported the harassment via informal conversations with supervisors 
without appearing troubled). 
 214. Marshall, supra note 151, at 86 (citing numerous articles and studies 
finding that women tend to refrain from complaining about sexual harassment). 
 215. Crenshaw, supra note 82, at 421–22, 424–27 (stating that the camaraderie 
grounded in a shared history of social exclusion “make[s] many black women 
reluctant to complain about or even to decisively reject the [black] harasser”). 
 216. Kresko v. Rulli, 432 N.W.2d 764, 766–68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
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for the defendant employer, noting in part that the woman had 
only complained about her supervisor’s conduct to another intern 
and to her daughter.217 
Although there was other evidence impacting the 
determination of whether the conduct was unwelcome,218 the 
appellate court focused on the intern’s failure to complain, noting 
that this intern showed signs of being quite assertive in other 
aspects of her life, with no empathy for how experiencing sexual 
harassment in the context of a career path might create different 
barriers to reporting.219  In the end, the appellate court stated 
“[t]he logical conclusion is that [the intern] did not complain 
because either the advances were welcome, or at least she had 
ambivalent feelings.”220  Here, the court’s opinion actually requires 
the intern to overcome a presumption that having mixed feelings 
about her supervisor necessarily translated into welcoming his 
sexual advances.221 
Even where a decision is sympathetic to the idea that women 
who have been harassed at work do not always formally complain, 
traces of the inclination to favor those who report over those who 
do not remain.  In one instance, an employer argued that a finding 
of unwelcome conduct, where the employee had not formally 
complained, should be overturned on appeal.222  The appellate 
court deferred to the findings of fact made by the trial court, which 
found that, among other things, the employee believed that 
ignoring her boss’s behavior communicated that the conduct was 
not welcome.223  In upholding the judgment of harassment, 
however, the appellate court also placed significance on the fact 
that the employee later directly told her boss that she was not being 
paid to tolerate his harassment.224  Favoring complainers over non-
 
 217. Id. at 768. 
 218. Other facts supporting the trial court’s decision included the two having 
lunch together frequently and discussing personal issues, the intern writing her 
supervisor a note expressing affection for him and reservations about the fact that 
he was married, the two having several kissing and petting sessions, and that the 
intern selected this internship knowing that this particular man would be her 
supervisor.  Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. This attitude resonates with the theme of regret noted above. 
 222. Hansen v. Regency Corp., No. C6-95-962, 1996 WL 33116, at *1–2 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1996). 
 223. Id. at *2. 
 224. Id. at *1. 
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complainers in determining whether conduct qualifies as 
unwelcome places the majority of female employees at a 
disadvantage in establishing sexual harassment. 
The idea that real harassment always prompts complaints 
about the conduct is so entrenched that courts have pondered 
whether establishing unwelcomeness requires repeated reports 
when the conduct continues to occur.225  Even the rare female 
employee who repeatedly complains about ongoing harassment is 
rewarded, not with a determination that the conduct was 
unwelcome as a matter of law, but with the opportunity to present 
her case to a jury.226  Employees who do not have the social or 
financial wherewithal to complain, confront, or quit would 
presumably receive a less favorable decision. 
In only one instance did a court express doubts about the 
validity of the presumption that women complain when conduct is 
unwelcome.227  In that case, the employee never told her 
supervisors that their conduct was unwelcome, but instead 
responded to their behavior with silence, terse disapproval, or 
blushing.228  In holding that the issue of unwelcomeness was clearly 
one of fact and denying the employer’s request for judgment as a 
matter of law, the court noted that she may have refrained from 
complaining as a result of the power disparity between herself, a 
secretary, and the harassers, who were high-level administrators for 
her employer.229  Progressive treatment of unwelcomeness should 
reveal, at a minimum, this level of awareness. 
A truly progressive interpretation would incorporate 
developments in the understanding of women’s behavior by 
 
 225. Hansen v. Genuine Parts Co., No. CIV.00-16DWFAJB, 2001 WL 586722, at 
*4 (D. Minn. May 29, 2001) (fleeting analysis of whether plaintiff had to keep 
complaining in order to establish unwelcomeness; plaintiff survived summary 
judgment; a jury should determine whether failing to continue reporting specific 
incidents was reasonable in light of the employer’s lack of response to her initial 
complaints). 
 226. Myers v. State, No. C4-99-855, 2000 WL 2620, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 
2000).  In reversing summary judgment, the evidence that impressed the court as 
demonstrating that the conduct was unwelcome was the employee’s repeated oral 
complaints about the conduct, negative reactions to harassing co-workers, and 
ultimate resignation from the job.  Id. 
 227. Dull v. St. Luke’s Hosp. of Duluth, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1024 (D. Minn. 
1998). The employer sought summary judgment, alleging among other things that 
the employee had failed to signal that the conduct of her bosses was unwelcome.  
Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 1025. 
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discounting or discarding the notion that a formal, timely 
complaint is the best evidence of unwelcomeness or that the lack of 
a complaint shows that conduct was welcome.  The state and 
federal courts of Minnesota have not produced opinions that 
promote much, if any, progress in this area. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
A progressive agenda as to the element of unwelcome conduct 
is not hard to articulate: outdated insinuations about what it means 
when women work outside the home and how women should 
behave with regard to sexuality should be rejected.  The 
descending hierarchy of protection from workplace harassment, in 
which women who are more sexually expressive or experienced are 
less entitled to object to harassment, should be eliminated.  
Evidentiary presumptions based on long-since debunked theories 
about how women react to sexual harassment should be set aside 
and replaced with an interpretation of unwelcome conduct that 
requires more from the defendant and less from the plaintiff. 
Minnesota courts have not been as proactive as they could be 
in identifying and criticizing efforts to infuse the unwelcomeness 
inquiry with outdated stereotypes and assumptions about proper 
female sexual behavior.  Drawing the lines more clearly would 
provide complaining employees with more basis for assessing the 
risk of enduring “a second rape”230 and force defendants to rethink 
efforts to play on bias and sexism to embarrass the plaintiff and win 
over the finder of fact.  Although the analysis will continue to be 
conducted on a case-by-case basis, explicit warnings from courts are 
needed to guide the conduct of the parties, the advice of counsel, 
and to otherwise create a framework of expectations as to how 
these aspects of human behavior will be treated by today’s courts.  
Such efforts comport with the progressive agenda of improving 
access to justice for those who tend to be underrepresented and 
disempowered by the legal system and, ultimately, of changing the 
underlying societal attitudes to promote social justice. 
 
 
 230. See MADIGAN & GAMBLE, supra note 105, at 3 (analyzing the ways in which 
“women who report rape are again raped by a system composed of well-
intentioned people who are nevertheless blinded by the myths of centuries”).  
Sexual harassment litigation has permitted similar abuses of civil complainants.  
Id. 
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